



Youth Political Participation in Sokoto: Breaking the Stronghold and Creating Pathways

JANUARY 2023

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We are sincerely grateful to Yiaga Africa for funding this important research on youth political participation in Sokoto. We are also thankful to our numerous Research Assistants who assisted tremendously with data collection. We so much thank the reviewer of this study whose observations and comments have helped to strengthen the quality of the research. In particular, we are so much grateful to Safiya Bichi and Ibrahim Faruk for all their patience and support throughout this research exercise.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


Youth political participation is critical to stable democratic process and governance and understanding its dynamics could help in scientific characterisation and classification of different polities in being responsive and responsible administratively. In other words, democratisation in New Democracies is often strengthened and/or punctuated by the measures of its all-inclusiveness of youth. Specifically, today there is in broader, albeit, ambiguous ways, a general resurgence in youth political activism in political parties, voting, social media political engagement, etc. The focus of this study is predicated on examining the role of political parties, (social) media, trust and domineering influence of godfathers in explaining the general resurgence in youth political activism, especially within the context of increasing voter turnout and voter registration in Sokoto state. The study specifically examines the role of political parties and (social) media in strengthening youth political participation in Sokoto; explores the extent to which trust in political parties and electoral institutions influence youth political participation in Sokoto State; and analyses the factor of godfathers as dominant political actors in youth political participation. Methodologically, the study employs mixed methods research design, in which qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection, sampling and data analysis were simultaneously employed. In the use of qualitative methods, KII and FGD were employed as instruments of data collection, while in quantitative methods; survey questionnaires were used to collect data. Simple descriptive statistics was used in the presentation and analysis of quantitative data. For qualitative data, four stages of analysis recommended by Connolly (2003) were employed. Six LGAs were sampled, two each from the three Senatorial Districts.

Based on presentation and analysis of the

empirical data, the study among other findings establishes that political parties as the important pillars of political activities are the platforms for youth political participation in Sokoto State. Majority of youth in the state identify with political parties as registered members and supporters and in participating in party activities such as party primaries, congresses, and membership mobilisation and election campaigns. However, despite their overwhelming support to political parties, youth could not participate as party candidates during elections. This limits the role of parties in driving youth political participation in Sokoto. Other factors that limit participation in party activities include, political violence, lack of internal party democracy, high cost of party activities, etc.; the level of youth political participation in Sokoto is higher. Despite this encouraging finding, however, over 72% of the youth had never contested any election for the very reasons of high cost of politics, domineering influence of godfathers, religious and cultural reasons and lack of godfather support; majority of youth in Sokoto use all the categories of social media (82%)—Twitter, Telegram, Instagram, Facebook, WhatsApp, YouTube, etc.—for various reason including entertainment, enlightenment, communicate with family members, business, political activities, etc. This offers great prospects to improve youth political participation; there is an apparent low trust in political institutions among the youth. Across the state, INEC, political parties and Government as pillars of political participation are not trusted by the youth. The main reasons for low trust in political parties include, lack of internal democracy, dominance of godfathers and other political elites. While for INEC, the reasons for low trust are poor conduct of elections, election rigging and cumbersome election procedures. And, for the Government, the reasons for low trust

include corruption, nepotism, high level of insecurity and not addressing people's needs and aspirations; godfathers as dominant political actors control Sokoto politics and governance at the detriment of youth political participation. The reasons for their dominance are high levels of education, financial and political influence. They are dominant because they are gatekeepers of political space and the political ecosystem of Sokoto and provide huge financial support to party and Government

will help in liberalising the political ecosystem to strengthen youth political participation at state levels; there should also be massive advocacy and sensitisation programmes by CSOs and other stakeholders on youth to enable them embrace tertiary education as it provides huge opportunities for economic empowerment and political participation. Overall, it will translate into better and more productive youth political participation in Sokoto. When youth are empowered



activities. Based on their gatekeeping activities, such as organising and perpetuating political violence, controlling political party machineries, controlling elected and appointed office holders, denying other people outside their cycles access to politics and undermining politically aspiring individuals, godfathers obliterate youth political participation.

The study thus recommends that parties' activities should be professionally regulated. Constitutionally INEC is responsible for such regulatory functions. However, such functions should be strengthened in order to ease the tension of dominance and excessive monetisation of Nigeria's political space. This

educationally they will be rational and self-conscientious in their political activities; the social media offers great opportunity for strengthening youth political participation. This is because in Sokoto majority of youth use social media for various reasons. Thus youth's use of social media should be professionally managed to enable them participate politically and employ social media handles for political reasons rather than mere entertainment. Political parties and Government should established professional Social Media Offices to handle such matters. Adequate training should be given to the officers, including training of youth in different capacities to use social media politically professionally. Through

this, the negative effects of social media as instrument of fake news, violence and conflict could be minimised; security agencies managing political activities should be adequately trained. This will enhance their professional conduct and nip in the bud any potentials for violence. Similarly, adequate security should always be provided during the conduct of any political activity, such as campaigns, party primaries and congresses, and general elections; political party management and activities should be reformed in such a way that excessive use of money, for example for the purchase of forms for party primaries and congresses is controlled. Similarly, party constitution should be amended to ease youth political participation. Thus beyond the appointment of a Woman Leader and Youth Leader, certain key political offices in party structures and organs should be reserved for youth. This will help to break the domineering influence of godfathers and ease the tension of control and gatekeeping of the political space. In all these issues, socio-political context is an existential reality that defines historical and contemporary political contours and ecosystem of governance. Accordingly, political culture of Sokoto being predominantly parochial and traditional to a large extent explains the current scenario of youth political participation. In this context, it is important that primary focus in advocacy and sensitisation be given to socio-political orientation on political participation. This would help to further liberalise the political space for youth participation, including women participation in key political activities. The advocacy should also be extended to political elites (godfathers) who strongly control the political space, often, outside the dictate of party constitutions.


In conclusion, the study argues that though breaking the stronghold of godfathers of the political space and political parties seems to be somewhat herculean, however, steady reforms in the structures of political space and adequate regulation of the activities of political parties, which are the mechanisms of the whole democratic system and for youth political participation, could break that stronghold and ease the space and tension for youth to also hold the keys to gates of political activities. The critical reform is to strengthen INCE regulatory functions and to amend party constitutions in order to improve youth political participation in all areas of political party activities, including party primaries, congresses, membership, party finance, campaigns, etc. overall, there is also need for massive advocacy and sensitisation across the state in order to break the social values of parochialism as such political culture directly inhibit functional youth political participation, including women participation.

ABREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS

APC	All Progressives Congress
APGA	All Progressive Grand Alliance
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
INEC	Independent National Electoral Commission
KII	Key Informant Interview
LP	Labour Party
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NNPP	New Nigerian People's Party
NNYDP	Nigerian National Youth Development Policy
NSPMC	Nigerian Security Printing and Minting Company
PDP	People's Democratic Party
PRP	People's Redemption Party
SIEC	State Independent Electoral Commission
SRP	

BASIC POLITICAL DATA

MAP OF SOKOTO STATE SHOWING LGAs



Delimitation Data: North West Geo-Political Zone

S/N	State	LGAs	RAs	PUs	Reg. Voters	PVCs Collected
1	Jigawa	27	287	3,527	2,111,106	1,625,721
2	Kaduna	23	255	5,101	3,932,492	3,648,831
3	Kano	44	484	8,074	5,457,747	4,696,747
4	Katsina	34	361	4,901	3,230,230	3,187,988
5	Kebbi	21	225	2,398	1,806,231	1,718,180
6	Sokoto	21	244	3,035	1,903,166	1,726,887
7	Zamfara	14	147	2,516	1,717,128	1,626,839
	Total	184	2,003	29,552	20,158,100	18,231,193

Sokoto state is one of the seven states in the NW geo-political zone, with a landmass of 25,973 Km², 23 LGAs, 244 RAs, 3,035 Pus, and 1, 903, 166 registered voters. With 1,803,742 PVCs collected before the 2019 General Elections, the State's PVC collection rate was 94.77%.

PART I



INTRODUCTION AND KEY RESEARCH ISSUES



1. Introduction

Democratisation as a process of institutionalising functional democratic governance is a multi-stakeholder political enterprise and ventures that requires substantial citizen participation to engineer its operational responsiveness, responsibility and sustainability. Perhaps, because of its multi-stakeholder perspective, even external actors endeavour to partake in the bigger project of democratic institutionalisation. The stakeholders are thus indispensable in the success of any democratic project. For example, numerous empirical studies have acknowledged the central role of political parties in not only inaugurating a democratic regime, but also in its consolidation. This also applies to Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), which are also very instrumental in nurturing democratic values, norms and governance. From a broader perspective, scholars also empirically established the role of economic prosperity, political culture, socio-cultural cohesion/homogeneity, and institutions, among others, in nurturing democratic governance and consolidation of democratic ethos and values. As a pluralist governance project, democratisation could also be defined by the nature of elite consensus and positional location of the different demographic groupings of the population. In other words, the quality of any democratic process could be measured and appreciated from the perspectives of the political participation of its key players and stakeholders, such as women and youth, minorities, PWDs, etc. Demographically, women and youth in virtually all countries across the world occupy the largest percentage of the population. Obviously, the nature and pattern of their political participation is a vital determinant of the inclusiveness of a political process.

Ironically, in many New Democracies, especially in Africa, Latin America and Asia, the picture of women and youth political participation is often arguably gloomy and distasteful. For example, Robertson (2009) observes two

divergent debates concerning youth political participation in established democracies—the trend of youth apathy about politics, which was blamed by media and politicians for the declining rates of participation and contrasting studies showing that youth/young people are interested in political participation but are alienated from formal political process. While Robertson (2009:27) found these contrasting views 'misleading', one could argue that it only empirically demonstrated the inherent contradictions that often characterise democratic process. This is perhaps, why this study on youth political participation in Nigeria is existentially and empirically important. For example, election and other political data in Nigeria would have indicated marginal youth political participation explained and disaggregated along socio-cultural, institutional and economic factors. Still, deeper and more clandestine variations exist across regional divides and even at state levels. This study, therefore, investigates various factors central to youth political participation in Sokoto State. The idea here is to identify factors that promote youth political participation within the context of the role of institutions, godfathers, INEC, etc. within the existential pathways that colour youth participation in the State. Accordingly, youth political participation within the argument of its bipolar approach (Robertson, 2009) could be empirically disaggregated from the perspective of these triangular variables—godfathers, formal institutions, trust and pathways. This study is, therefore, predicated on this theoretical triangle on youth political participation in Sokoto State.

2. Statement of Research Problem

Youth political participation is critical to stable democratic process and governance and

understanding its dynamics could help in scientific characterisation of and classification of different polities in being responsive and responsible administratively. In other words, democratic process in New Countries is often strengthened and/or punctuated by the measures of its all-inclusiveness of youth. The significance of youth political activities was demonstrated in the UK general election of 2016 (Sloam and Henn, 2017:1). Their political activism explains the "significant cultural, political or social change arising from the actions or influence of young people" (OED, 2017) in overturning the general political landscape of the UK. This is youth awakening, which represents both a radical shift and political paradigm. Specifically, today there is in broader, albeit, ambiguous ways, a general resurgence in youth political activism in political parties, voting, social media political engagement, etc. This is the focus of the study. More straight to the issue, the study is predicated on examining the role of political parties and (social) media in explaining the general resurgence in youth political activism, especially within the context of increasing voter turnout and voter registration in Sokoto state. But in New Democracies, this resurgence and awakening though visibly seen in Nigeria's increasing voter registration and turnout in general elections, such participation remains at the edge of political space. Many factors appear to somewhat affect what could have been a breakthrough in Nigeria's march to democratic progress. This study investigates such factors, which could have obstructed youth political participation in Sokoto State. It could therefore, be hypothesised that political party activities and the social media have tremendously expanded through the lenses of voter registrations and voter turnout in general elections, the frontiers of youth political participation, which beyond this, the dominant political actors (god fathers), deficit in trust of political institutions, higher cost of political activities, etc. have continued to limit the frontiers of youth political participation to

the basic civic duties and political symbolism. The scientific and pragmatic utility of this study is explained by taking on board such empirical contextual factors, which though may reveal commonalities at national levels, but are likely to show variance at Sokoto State and Northwest and other regional levels in Nigeria. Such local and cultural nuances of Sokoto State would have tremendous implications on policy design and political reforms in Nigeria. They would also point to areas of direction for quick interventions by relevant policy and advocacy stakeholders.

3. Research Questions

The main question of this research is *how can higher rate of youth political participation in over turnout and voter registration in Sokoto be explained from 1999-2022?* While, the specific questions are

1. What is the role of political parties and (social) media in strengthening youth political participation in Sokoto?
2. To what extent does trust in political parties and electoral institutions (INEC & SIEC) influence youth political participation in Sokoto State?
3. What are the roles of godfathers as dominant political actors in youth political participation?

4. Aim and Objectives of the Study

The main aim of this research is to explain

higher rate of youth political participation in over turnout and voter registration in Sokoto from 1999-2022, while the specific objectives are to:

1. Examine the role of political parties and (social) media in strengthening youth political participation in Sokoto;
2. Explore the extent to which trust in political parties and electoral institutions (INEC & SIEC) influence youth political participation in Sokoto State; and
3. Analyse the *factor* of godfathers as dominant political actors in youth political participation.

5. Scope and Limitations of the Study

It is obvious that in any study of political participation (regardless of which demographic group is involved especially in New Democracies), the most important aspect will be to identify essential factors that feed into and/or constrain such participation. Thus, in the study of youth political participation, though it could be methodologically approached from varying perspectives, this study will cover structural agencies of socialisation, the role of institutions and relationship between youth and such institutions. Other factors,

though significant in the overall process and understanding of youth political participation, such as religion, culture, level of education, family, school, will be used as intervening variables. Accordingly, the study will cover only 1999-2022. This period is important, as it is the aftermath of 2019 general elections and moving towards the eve of 2023 general elections. By the time of completion of the study, preparations for 2023 general elections would be in top gear. This could explain the policy implication of this study.

6. Significance of the Study

This is a very significant research, which is being conducted at a time when Nigeria's democratisation is facing enormous challenges and problems in the areas of quality governance, service delivery, anti-corruption, insecurity and decline in political trust. In addition to this, INEC is also conducting online and physical voter registration in preparation for 2023 general elections. Preliminary statistics seem to indicate surprising divergent responses from across the country. Any study, therefore, on youth political participation will surely have fundamental policy implications in the areas of expanding electoral participation (voter registration, voting, and other citizenry civic engagement) for improved quality governance.

PART II



LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK



2.1. The Rationale of Participation

It is generally assumed that political participation is rational. That is, individuals engage in political activity to pursue particular goals, and they decide to participate when the benefits of such participation outweigh the costs (for descriptions of rational choice models, see Aldrich 1993; Downs 1957; Jackman 1992; Whiteley 1995). Though Verba and Nie (1972) discuss some aspects of rationality, they do not confront the logical dictate of collective action because nonparticipants cannot be excluded from collective benefits, and it is not in the interest of any single individual to bear the costs of participating (Olson 1965). The collective action problem is probably identified most closely with the study of voter turnout. Downs (1957) and Riker and Ordeshook (1968) posited formal decision theory models of voter turnout, which are the basis of "the calculus of voting" (for a review of these models, and research that followed, see Aldrich 1993; on game theoretic models, see Grafstein 1991; Palfrey 1983). Because an individual's probability of determining the outcome of an election is almost always very small, the costs of voting will always outweigh the benefits and individuals will therefore abstain. The "paradox of participation" is that, contrary to predictions of rational choice models (zero turnout or no participation, in most cases), voting in elections and other types of participation are fairly common. In the case of group membership, Olsofs (1965) primary solution to this paradox is to provide selective incentives to individuals who join - that is, provide a benefit to those who choose to contribute.

Alternatively, Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974) propose the "minimax regret" decision rule; rather than being determined by the probability of affecting the election outcome, individuals' decisions to vote are guided by their preference to minimise the probability that

their least preferred option (candidate) occurs (wins). Uhlaner (1989) argues that individuals' decisions to vote reflect group leaders' efforts in mobilising their vote, so that the group can obtain benefits from elected politicians (e.g., closer issue positions). Hence, individuals' decisions to vote are investment decisions, and not just expressive or consumptive behaviour. Morton (1991) demonstrates that this result holds only if candidates are unconstrained in position-taking. This illustrates a limitation of the rational choice literature, where the most work has been done in explaining a type of political behaviour that is least appropriate to be studied within this framework, as well as the limitations of studying voter turnout alone. The only empirical evidence we have on high-cost, high (potential) benefit participation focuses on protest as a form of collective action. In all these youth are key stakeholders.

2.2. The Concept of Youth

According to Middaugh, Schofield & Ballard (2017), youth is a time of rapidly expanding capacities, expectation of autonomy and identity exploration. Civic engagement during adolescence predicts adult volunteering and voting. Youth is the time of life when one is young, but often means the time between childhood and adulthood. Furthermore, civic engagement during adolescence can promote positive developmental outcomes, particularly for marginalised and at-risk youth. Definitions of the specific age range that constitutes youth or adolescence vary. An individual's actual maturity may not correspond to his/her chronological age, as immature individuals can exist at all ages. The Nigerian National Youth Development Policy (2001) described youth as people aged 18–35. The United Nations, for statistical purposes defines those persons

between the ages of 15 and 24 as youth without prejudice to other definition by member states. Youth could also be described as “the appearance, freshness, vigour, spirit, etc. The characteristic of one who is young (youth) is best understood as period of transition from the dependence of childhood to adulthood independence. Youth is a more fluid category than a fixed age group. However, the age is the easiest way to define this group, particularly in relation to education and employment” (NNYDP, 2001). Youth is often indicated as a period between the age where a person may lead compulsory education and the age at which he/she finds his/her first employment. This latter age limit has been increasing as higher level of unemployment and the cost of setting up an independent household, which puts many young people into a prolonged period of dependency. Youth constitute a dominant force for national mobilisation and growth and as such have a crucial role to play in the all-important task of nation building. Youth are an important group in every society. The success or otherwise of any nation, depends on the quality of its youth. Participating in political life is proposed to play an important role in youth development. For example, youth participation shapes civic and political concerns, identity and purpose, academic engagement and achievement, and health and well-being. The distinguishing characteristics of participatory political activities (that they are focused on gaining agency and empowerment, are peer based, and are interactive) might promote positive outcomes for youth.

In addition, civic activities that are peer-based and youth-led may increase youth connection and engagement in school settings by providing youth with opportunities to influence their political and social contexts. Civic activities that are engaging and interactive rather than passive may especially empower youth, effectively teaching them about political issues, engaging them in school, and reducing risky behaviours. Importantly, civic engagement activities that enhance abilities to acquire voice, power, and

influence in systems they are often left out of might be especially relevant in the positive development of marginalised youth.

2.3. Political Parties and Youth Participation in Politics

Political parties are important pillars of democracy. They are catalyst to the development of modern democracy. Through their numerous political and social activities they serve as ladder and avenues for political mobilisation and participation. Of the numerous functions of political parties, in particular, the ones that critically relate to the project of youth political participation are recruitment, mobilisation and participation as objective socio-political and economic reality. This function is intuitively linked with the above and indeed with several activities of political parties. This function is also performed by all kinds of political parties (small and big, institutionalised and un-institutionalised). In the process of political recruitment and formation of government, parties engage citizens through campaign activities. It is this process of political engagement that is called mobilisation, the result of which lead to participation. Wattenberg (2002) emphasises that when Schattsneider wrote, “political parties created democracy”, he was intuitively referring to how parties helped expand political participation through mobilisation of citizens. Historically, parties played enormous role in the expansion of voting rights and helped to increase the frontiers of democracy. Wattenberg (2002:64) therefore, concludes “the saga of electoral participation in advance industrialised countries is one in which the state of political parties and the party system generally has played a critical role.” As

political parties are central in the workability of representative democracy, electorates are equally (party members and voters) central in the activities and functionality of political parties. More often, the power of a political party is measured by the capacity of its members and percentage of votes scored in a particular election. The capacity of a party, measured in this perspective, is therefore, the function of many factors, among which are resources expended for mobilisation and participation. Wielhoumer and Lockerbie (1994) also stress the important role of parties in the electorate. Sorauf (1967:37-8) however, argues that functionally, parties exist in three arenas: first, a party exists as an organisation where "men and women join for concerted action to achieve goals". Secondly, governmentally, a party exists in political and non-political offices and "in virtually all legislatures of the democracies." And, thirdly, a party exists in the electorates, which is the "least stable, least active, least involved and least well-organised" of the three arenas, and which according to Wielhoumer and Lockerbie (1994) is made up of those people who have a psychological attachment to the party and who often show their support to the party at polls and beyond. In the world of parties, Sorauf (1967:46) maintains, there is a crucial relationship between "its committed activists, loyalists and office holders on one hand and the general electorates on the other" (cited in Wielhoumer and Lockerbie, 1994). In this triangular world of parties, electorates and party members form two essential pillars, while party organisation is the steering and coordinating organ. However, in the triangular relationship, through its activities, party organisation mobilises both party members and electorates and encourages their political participation. What is political mobilisation and why is it an important function of parties? Narrowly defined, political mobilisation is a process through which collective actors with collective identity are built (Martiniello, 2005). This process entails certain organisation employing resources and tactics to garner

support. In conceptualising political mobilisation, Nedelmann (1987:183) identifies four problems associated with definition of this term. These are: (i) mobilisation broadly defined as the "development of relationship between individuals and the institutionalised representatives of the political elites". He identifies political parties, interest organisations and the state as the major political actors. On this context, Nedelmann (1987:83) defines mobilisation as the "development of processes of interaction between at least three types of actors: unorganised individuals, organised intermediary actors and the government." The problem with this definition is that other agents of mobilisation are excluded in the picture. (ii) The second conceptual problem is concerned with describing and explaining the course of political mobilisation process. According to him, often in explaining this process, some metaphors are used, which depict different actors representing different hierarchical levels of relationships. Entangling these processes with complex network of actors is problematic. (iii) The third problem is concerned with the question of what kinds of activities should be involved in mobilisation (for extensive discussion of this, see Kura, 2008).

While in the past, political engagement of youth was mainly channelled through activism in political parties (membership, voluntary work, door-door campaigning, attending meeting etc.), the last decade has shown that political parties are facing difficulties in attracting new party members, and in particular young people (UGYR, 2016). This may be true in advanced democracies. However, in New Democracies of Africa and elsewhere, political parties remain formidable institutions of political participation. Their sine-qua-non functions to democratic institutionalisation (Kura, 2008) suggest that through their roles, parties could provide avenues for youth political participation. For example, political parties are well known to provide varied functions such as political mobilisation, candidate nomination/selection, electoral mobilisation,

issue structuring, social integration, interest aggregation, societal representation, forming and sustaining government (Gunther and Diamond, 2001). No one can argue against parties performing those functions. However, this is not to mean, "all parties perform all of those functions, nor that they perform them equally well" (Gunther and Diamond, 2001:8). Despite the seeming decline in the functions of parties, yet no institution in democratic system has "robbed" them of these roles. It is, therefore, only saying the obvious that through, particularly the functions of mobilisation and government formation, parties offer avenues for youth political participation. Thus, despite the seeming challenges associated with these party functions in Nigeria, still it could be argued that higher youth voter turnout in successive elections and voter registration in Sokoto, could strongly be attributed to the functional activities of political parties. This hypothetical argument could validate and explain the critical significance of this study. Furthermore, this is a new thinking within the context of the functions of political parties vis-à-vis youth political participation in predominantly traditional Sokoto societies. Within the same token, it could also be argued that if party activities could tantalise and perhaps engineer youth political participation to that extent, then why could that participation remain at the edge of voter turnout in election and voter registration? This is an important question, the answer to which could reveal "other" aspects of party structures and administrative functions that seemingly obstruct youth participation in higher and advanced level of political participation such as holding higher party offices at state and national levels and serving as party candidates in state and national elections. This is a conundrum and perhaps why this study is empirically unique, novel and topical.

2.4. The Media and

Youth Political Participation

Media and indeed social media have penetrated all levels of the information society and have catalysed and crystallised the process of democracy and political development everywhere in the world. The media, a modern trend in information and knowledge dissemination, has taken communication beyond the limitations of the traditional way of communicating and socialising, making it an essential part of people's lives; affecting their social, political and economic activities (Omotayo & Folorunso, 2020). One of the major applications of social media is social networks, where millions of people are connected to utilise an open domain for interacting with others and politically socialising with all types of media such as text, voice, images, or videos (Alquraan et al., 2017). The interactive nature of social media makes them fit to be used for many purposes such as job search, socialisation, education, entertainment, governance, political participation, among others. Social media, therefore, as social instruments of communication, promote participation, connectedness, opportunity to disseminate information across geographical boundaries and the fostering of relationships and interactions among people. Commonly - used social media are Facebook, WhatsApp, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, Telegram, LinkedIn, etc.

One of the many uses of social media is that it supports the democratisation of knowledge and information, thereby making people both information producers and consumers. The ubiquitous access to social media has democratising effects as they offer citizens opportunities to engage and participate in political processes. Social media offers engagement in a medium that fits comfortably with peoples' mode of life and facilitates political participation of citizens by helping

them monitor and influence government decisions. The growing popularity of social media has motivated scholars to explore the roles social media play in everyday life and in facilitating political participation and engagement.

The emergence of the Internet, which in turn gave birth to social networking sites, brought a paradigm shift in democratic process and radical transformation of the society where the populace is no longer passive in government activities, as the media provide new avenues for political engagement. The platforms have "exponentially multiplied the possibilities for the retrieval and dissemination of political information, thus affording any Internet user with a variety of supplemental access points to political information and activity that come at little cost in time, money and effort" (Breuer and Groshek, 2014: 165). It is not surprising Diamond (2010: 70) refers to social media as a "liberation technology that expands political, social and economic freedom." Milakovich (2010) also presents social media as a tool for increased citizen participation in the political environment. Unlike the other mass media, social networking media provide two-way and even multi-way forms of communication channels (Diamond, 2010; Milakovich, 2010), which enhance the feedback process and encourage interaction among users. It is this interactive nature of social networking media that creates opportunities for citizens to participate in online democratic and electioneering processes which Medimorec et al. (2011) referred to as electronic participation (e-participation). Online political activities (e-participation) include writing emails to politicians, visiting politicians' campaign websites, donating money online, electronic campaign, electronic voting and so forth.

The many benefits of using social media for political participation include granting citizens the opportunity to participate actively and get involved fully in the political discourse by adding their voices on issues posted on

social media sites. The platforms also afford electorates a friendlier avenue of assessing candidates for political offices and promoting transparency in governance, thus, advancing the tenets of participatory democracy that sees the media as debate avenues which aid tremendously the actualisation of involvement in politics. Social media also offer a range of potentials for innovating governance and finding new ways of governing by creating an opportunity of listening to citizens' opinion poll online, thereby setting ideas about citizenry needs including the possible reaction of people towards public decision-making processes.

Even though the advent of social media in the political arena has drastically impacted the politicians and voters alike, the use of social media for political participation has its drawbacks. Misinformation, political harassment, rumours, fake news, propaganda and trolling are some of the problems of using social media for political participation (Diamond, 2010). Besides, the topic of bots affecting the outcome of elections has recently become a mainstream topic during elections. Bots are used to leak fake news stories, spread dissension and create fake profiles on social media platforms that sow divide between people and political parties. Usage of social media for political participation also exacerbates the problem of echo chambers (Diamond, 2010), with everyone feeling the need to be on one side or the other. People only see contents and viewpoints they agree with when they scroll down their news feed, which makes it unlikely that voters will ever have to sincerely defend their political stance unless they actively seek people and media outlets with opposing political views. In addition, the use of social media for political participation also allows for foreign interference in elections.

The 2011 general elections in Nigeria were, in fact, the first litmus test of the use of social media by political parties, political candidates and civil society organisations. The election was historic in the sense that it was the first

time that social media facilitated political communication and participation. Since then, social media have been deployed in the electoral processes in Nigeria.

Studies have investigated the use of social media for political participation in Nigeria. Chinedu-Okeke and Obi (2016), for instance, explore the extent of South-eastern Nigeria electorates' involvement with social media for electioneering process and found that political campaigns through the social media had a significant effect on electorate's decision-making and participation in Nigeria's 2011 and 2015 elections. Similarly, Okoro and Santas (2017) appraise the utilisation of social media for political communication in the 2011 Nigerian presidential election to determine whether voters' choice of presidential candidates was influenced by their social media use. The results revealed that majority of the respondents' choices of presidential candidates were influenced by the use of social media. Similarly, the respondents believed the two selected presidential candidates were popular because they used social media in their political campaign. Ekwueme and Folarin (2017) examined the role of social media in the Nigerian 2015 presidential election processes. Findings show that social media played a major role in mobilising people, creating awareness, as well as participation and circulation of information about candidates. Apuke and Tunca (2018) also examined the implications of social media usage in the electoral processes and campaigns in the Nigerian 2011 and 2015 general elections. Findings show that social media was employed due to its participatory nature and that social media was applied to influence the thoughts of many young people, increasing their political awareness. Thus, these studies established that the voting patterns during the 2011 and 2015 elections were influenced by social media usage. Besides, in the 2015 elections, it was found that during the collation of results, social media was applied to inform the public of the results in several states across the country, making it difficult for

manipulations of results.

While there are several studies, which have investigated the influence of social media on the political dimension of the society, few (e.g. Abdulrauf, 2016; Onyechi, 2018; Dagona et al., 2013) have explored the use of social media for political participation among youths in Nigeria. The findings of Abdulrauf (2016) on cognitive engagement and online political participation on Facebook and Twitter among youths in Nigeria and Malaysia revealed that access to political information on Facebook and Twitter was one of the factors that influence online political participation of youth. Onyechi (2018) also found that Nigerian students spent more time on social media and participated in campaigns during elections, while Dagona et al. (2013) found a significant relationship between social media usage and political participation and mobilisation among Nigerian youths. These studies have been able to reveal increasing use of social media for political participation among youths. In relation to this study, it would be interesting, therefore, to investigate the role of social media in the increasing voter turnout during elections and voter registration in Sokoto. By implication, it would thus be assumed that such symbolic impressive youth participation in higher voter turnout and voter registration could have been deeply influenced by social media. Perhaps, this is even so, if political parties and other key elections stakeholders, like the CSOs, INEC and community-based associations employed social media as political orientation and mobilisation instruments to drive youth this important political adventure. Moreover, on a different rhyme, the role of social media ironically has not pushed youth political participation beyond the symbolism of higher voter turnout and higher registration. Then, what is the real disconnect? The answer to this could be directly and/or indirectly linked to the activities, internal workings and operations of political parties and dominant political actors defined as "godfather" who wield enormous amount of power in the democratic processes

generally and political party activities specifically. Thus, youth political participation must be investigated and appreciated within the trio trajectories of institutions, (social) Media and dominant political actors.

2.5. Electoral Institutions and Youth Political Participation

Scholars have long viewed institutions as important determinants of political outcomes. It is only recently, however, that research has linked institutions to mass attitudes and behaviour, and almost no research has considered the way in which institutions may have different effects on men's and women's political involvement (Kittilson & Schwindt-Bayer, 2012). Across contemporary democracies, election is the most obvious means of political participation. Electoral institutions that are constitutionally saddled with the responsibility of organizing, coordinating and conducting election can therefore greatly enhance youth political participation.

Electoral institutions' structure links between citizens and the democratic process. As Anderson et al. (2004) observe, "institutions are not simply disembodied objects external to voters, rather, are factors that help shape and give meaning to political attitudes." The influence of institutions on political behaviour has been a central question in the study of mass behaviour for decades but more recently with the proliferation of cross-national surveys and multilevel statistical modelling strategies, comparative politics scholars have focused their empirical efforts on this macro-micro nexus (ibid). In fact, among the most important criteria for assessing electoral institutions is their ability to maximize political participation

and enable full engagement among citizens (Gallagher & Mitchell, 2008). For example, citizens in democracies with power sharing institutions display greater satisfaction with democracy than citizens in majoritarian democracies.

Electoral institutions affect political engagement and participation for rational and symbolic reasons. Literature theorises that electoral rules provide rational incentives for political participation. At the same time electoral institutions can symbolize a government's commitment to democracy, power sharing, representation and inclusion and in doing so trigger emotional responses from citizens that can draw them into electoral politics.

Beyond the foregoing explanations, however, electoral institutions perform several functions that enhance youth political participation. To begin with, the constitutional role of registration of political parties saddled on electoral institutions enables youth to form or join political association that satisfy legal requirements and can influence democratic decision. In other words, without putting in place, an institution to monitor and oversee the activities of political parties, the desire for parties to contribute to democratic consolidation would be a mirage. Moreover, electoral institutions undertake the task of voter registration. It is only the commission that registers and determines the number of people that are qualified to participate in an election. The mere possession of permanent voter's card (PVC) as in the case of Nigeria can prompt someone cast his vote on election day. Conversely, non-possession of PVC could lead to poor voter turnout and political apathy.

Electoral institutions are also saddled with the responsibility of delineation of constituency. Small constituencies or electoral districts that further widen the scope of political participation are created by the commission. If properly delineated, the constituencies created by electoral commissions can greatly inspire youth to participate in politics at the local

levels because of the availability of different alternatives. And if there is a positive link between political knowledge and participation, then, invariably electoral commission facilitates youth political participation as the former appoints and train the latter with respect to electoral issues. The commission also carries out massive campaign aimed at education of the public politically from how to properly obtain voters card, how to cast votes and how to defend the votes. All these are instances of political participation facilitated by electoral bodies.

Electoral institutions provide financial assistance to political parties. The prevalence of political parties in Nigeria and other developing countries is attributed in some quarters to the material benefit inherent in forming or establishing political parties. This is because, as Kura (2014: 129) argued, section 90 of 2006 Electoral Act requires the National Assembly "to approve a grant for disbursement to all political parties contesting elections and provide annual grants to all registered political parties as financial assistance for their operational activities". This could explain why the Uwais Panel recommended that only parties that scored 2.5 of the votes in 2011 election should be eligible to receive financial support from INEC. This is because, Nigerian parties are seen as vehicles of investments bereft of any ideological foundation. Put differently, the financial assistance given to parties by electoral institutions can inspire youth to form or join political parties and consequently widen their political participation.

The major goal of establishing electoral institution is to ultimately ensure free and fair election. When the electoral processes are transparent and electoral integrity becomes the norm, youth will be more engaged in politics. First, knowing that one's vote counts could make him endure any difficulty such as joining and waiting particularly in a long voting queue on election day. This is so because transparent election reinvigorates the hope

of the masses of getting responsible leaders. Secondly, a sound electoral management body will ensure that all anti-democratic practices such as monetization of election and other aspects like vote buying are reduced or eliminated in the polity. This could facilitate youth political participation as one can contest for election even without strong financial capacity. Furthermore, even in the aftermath of electoral contest, Electoral Management Bodies entertain electoral petitions that also widen the scope of youth political participation. By being up to date with nuances of the petition, youth could become more politically educated and consequently more engaged in the political process.

2.6 Dominant Political Actors and Youth Political Participation

Dominant political actors' facilitation of youth into the political participation could be seen as an exercise of paradoxical results. When talking about political domination, godfathers are the first category of people that come to mind. And while some political godfathers may enhance youth political participation positively, political godfathers across many communities tend to facilitate youth political participation negatively, as the former group uses the latter as an instrument to achieve their political goals.

Political godfathers are found all over the world. They consist of rich men whose contributions to campaign funds of some candidates have helped the latter to win elections. Even in the developed world, such people invest heavily, most especially in media, to shore up the image of their candidate while at the same time helping to discredit rival candidates (Albert, 2005). Thus, godfathers are political sponsors

who use money and influence to win support for their preferred candidates. Put differently, godfatherism refers to a situation where there is a big man who wields enormous political power and then anoints a godson, who he adopts as a candidate for the election.

There are quite several ways through which dominant political actors (godfathers) could facilitate youth political participation. These ways can however be categorized into, and viewed from, three main dimensions, i.e. during political campaign and electioneering, on election day and after assumption of political offices by the godsons. Before exploring these dimensions further, however, it is instructive to strike a distinction between the advanced western democracies and the developing states like Nigeria regarding political domination. No doubt, the concept of godfatherism though a new vocabulary in Nigerian politics, it has become very popular and established and the central goal of any godfather is hijacking and controlling local, regional or national state political apparatuses to his advantage and personal interests. In Europe and America, however, godfatherism has not yet entered their political vocabularies but similar concepts that have less political effects such as political donors or political financiers could be found.

Unlike Nigeria, such political donors may not aim at establishing control over political power holders because of the established nature of their democracies. They nonetheless have motives. In the words of Nassmacher (2014:266):

Political donors are frequently classified according to the amount they contribute to a party or candidate. Those who give small donations are assumed to be driven by community – oriented goals or policies in general. Those who give considerably more may do so for ideological or pragrammatic/practical considerations. If the donations cannot be subsumed under either category,

the donor is expected to be pursuing some sorts of personal gain (a specific policy, a personal favour or simply access to someone in power). The goal of individuals or groups that make large donations is generally to get access to argue or explain a particular issue or case, often in the hope that they will receive special treatment.

During the electioneering period, youth are easily mobilised by godfathers because of the latter's influence and enormous wealth. They sponsor youths from primary to general election and instrumentalise the same youth in the process of political campaigning and rallies. The various categories of youth seen on social media campaigning for one politician, or another must have direct or indirect link with a particular political godfather. As the just concluded 2022 primary elections demonstrated, business entrepreneurs are increasingly assuming the roles of political godfathers. In Katsina State for example, the former Managing Director of Nigerian Security Printing and Minting Company (NSPMC) Abbas Masanawa who resigned from his lucrative position to contest for the All Progressives Congress (APC) gubernatorial ticket in the state is widely seen to be sponsored by the State richest man and business mogul Alhaji Dahiru Mangal. Similarly, in Funtua/Dandume Federal Constituency, the APC's ticket for the House of Representatives was literally contested by two young billionaires i.e. Alhaji Abdullahi A. Albasu and the owners of NAK General Merchants who sponsored Barrister Abubakar Muhammad and Alhaji Murtala Hassan respectively spending millions of Naira in the process. In essence, as Kura (2014:134) argued:

Godfather politics has permeated the whole Nigeria State. From Borno to Oyo, Anambra to Taraba, Kwara to Gombe States, the story is the same. It has also permeated local politics and political parties. However, it is important to note that the magnitude and

intensity of godfatherism differ from one state to another, perhaps from one region to another. The cases of Anambra, Kwara and Oyo State empirically distinguished themselves. These states present a clear case of how godfathers become the major party funders and who have absolute control of their respective political terrain determined the political fortunes of their anointed candidates [...] the political significance of parties have become no longer determined by popular support like in other countries such as U.S, U.K, South Africa and Bostwana etc. but by administrative manipulation by the godfathers through all necessary means.

Furthermore, Nigerian electoral process is characterized by irregularities such as vote buying, ballot box snatching, disrupting result collation and intimidation of political opponents among others. These irregularities are perpetrated and amplified by youth who are purposely recruited by political godfathers to do so. When the final result of the election is not in favour of these godfathers, they, in some instances, motivate youth into taking unpopular actions. In recent past, Nigeria has witnessed series of post electoral violence that claimed hundreds of lives. As Ayoade (2006) stated, this violence could be attributed to godfathers:

The godfather gives support to install the godson oftentimes by dubious anti-democratic means. Their strategies are everything but fear. They dispense violence freely on those who stand on their way. In this they play the additional role of a warlord. They establish, train and maintain a standing personal army, which they ostensibly supplement with a sprinkling of official police detachment. In order to effect electoral change, they bribe election officials to deliver the winning election figures. The initial support given by the godfather then becomes an investment with a colossal rate

of returns because the godfather becomes the defector governor. The godfather makes substantial critical governance decisions, appointments and is recipient of either major juicy contracts or earns inordinate stipend. Godfathers sometimes reverse executive decisions (cited in Ayeni (2019:6).

From the foregoing, it is clear that dominant political actors play a key role in youth political participation whether positively or negatively. As it has been explained above, the actors' facilitation of youth into political participation becomes negative when the youth take to violent means to satisfy their masters' political goals. However, even though it may sound pre-emptive, the cases of the duo Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso and Peter Obi depict two politicians who have positively enhanced youth political participation. Kwankaso has sponsored the education of less privileged youth in the national and foreign higher institutions more than arguably any other Nigeria politician. After graduation, these youth come back to Nigeria, becoming more engaged in political discourses about the way forward for the country. They also more often openly mobilize support for their political godfather. On the other hand, Peter Obi as Kakanda (2022) opined, "has energized the youth demographic in the South East and renewed faith of the Igbo in the Nigeria election in a fashion even Ojukwu never did when he ran for president... If the reported surge in PVC registration and youth involvement in politics inspire more Igbo to vote, this culture of tokenizing the ethnic group may just be nailed in coffin next year".

2.7. Theoretical Framework

Any study on youth political participation would require a coherent theory(s) as framework for

scientific analysis. The theoretical framework will give meaning to the data and analysis unambiguous. This is because in the absence of such a theory the meaning of evidence will be too ambiguous. It will also enable clear and systematic generation of conclusions and policy implications. Generally, there are five broad theoretical approaches/models that could underpin any research on political participation, which have developed in the political science literature. These are: (1) civil voluntarism, (2) rational choice, (3) social psychological, (4) mobilisation, and (5) general incentive approaches (Whiteley and Seyd, 2002). This study on youth political participation will employ multiple theoretical approaches as frameworks of analysis. Thus social psychological and mobilisation theories will principally be used, though where possible other theories will also be employed for illustrative purposes. This is not because other theories not used here are irrelevant here, however, given the research questions and objectives of the study, which are designed along the variables of structural agencies of socialisation, institutional trust and pathways for participation, the social psychological and mobilisation will be aptly suitable.

For example, the civil engagement voluntarism approach is also known as resource model, which originated from the excellent and seminal works of Verba and Nie (1972) largely assumes that:

We focus on three factors to account for political activity. We suggested earlier that one helpful way to understand the three factors is to invert the usual question and ask instead why people do not become political activists. Three answers come to mind: because they can't; because they don't want to; or because nobody asked. In other words people may be inactive because they lack resources, because they lack psychological engagement with politics, or because they are outside of the recruitment networks that bring people into

politics. (Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 1995: 269)

The model submits that political participation is often defined by resources that include 'time, money and civic skills' (Verba, Scholzman and Brady, 1995:271). However, the psychological engagement of the approach is concerned with individual's sense of political efficacy and the recruitment aspect is defined as request for participation from individual's place of work, religious organisations or other political associations, especially from friends, relatives or social and political acquaintances. It is clear this model can provide good guide for analysis in this study, very limited in supporting evidence for unambiguous analytical discourse. The rational choice approach on the other hand assumes that individuals are rational in their political participation in that they could:

- i. always make a decision when confronted with a range of alternatives;
- ii. rank all the alternatives facing them in order of their preferences;
- iii. their preference ranking is transitive;
- iv. always choose from among the possible alternatives that which ranks highest in their preference ordering; and
- v. always make the same decision each time they are confronted with the same alternatives (see Downs 1957:6; Whiteley and Seyd, 2002).

But the model, despite its promise, is difficult to apply in understanding political participation in New Democracies. This is because often youth are either not rational or are ambiguously rational and/or alternatives from which ordering preference and choosing among them do not even exist. Notwithstanding this limitation, the approach could be employed to explain those aspects of 'rationality' in youth political participation in Nigeria for illustrative demonstration.

The social psychological approach to the analysis of political participation explains the relationship between attitudes and behaviour in political participation. The theory identifies three kinds of variables that determine behaviour: (i) attitudes towards the behaviour, (ii) normative beliefs (both personal and social); and (iii) motivation to comply with the norms. Thus the expectations-values-norms theory explains behaviour in terms of two classes of factors—expected benefits and social norms. The major concern here is that individuals are seen as utilitarian who calculate the benefit of different courses of actions and they are also seen as actors embedded in networks of social norms and beliefs, which provide internal and external motivations to behave in certain ways, here define within the contexts of political participation. This is where structural agencies that shape behaviour (social norms and beliefs) work to influence youth political participation in Nigeria and Sokoto in particular.

The mobilisation theory contends that individuals' participation in politics is a response to various opportunities in their political society and stimuli (factors) from other people. This theory is related to the resource model. Accordingly, some people participate because the opportunities for them to do so are greater than for other people and also because they are persuaded to get involved by other people (Whiteley and Seyd, 2002:29). As the model is linked to resource approach, it means that individuals with high economic status are most likely to have access to political institutions such political parties, interest groups or campaign and advocacy organisations. This is perhaps because these institutions are more commonly found in societies with high socio-economic status. Interestingly, since opportunities are not uniform across the populations, an interaction between resources and opportunities mobilises some individuals to get involved (Whiteley and Seyd, 2002: 50). This also aptly captures the general contours of this study, particularly in relation to creating pathways for youth political participation.

In addition to resources and opportunities that could drive individuals to participate, the nature of institutional trust and electoral system design and ways to break strong hold and dominance of institutions by certain powerful groups are environmental stimuli that could also engender and/or hamper political participation (Johnston 1987; Johnston, Pattie, and Johnston 1989; John-ston and Pattie 1995; Pattie, Johnston, and Fieldhouse 1995).

And, finally, the general incentive theory was introduced to explain the incidence of high-intensity type of political participation, such as canvassing, campaigns, attending meetings and running for office. In the context of the assumptions of this study, the high-intensity participation is highly restricted area for youth in Nigeria. Some powerful political elites seem to somewhat dominate the gateways of participation into these political domains. The institutional gateways are evidently foreclosed. Finding ways to break this dominance vis-à-vis create pathways is one of the primary objectives of this study. It should be emphasised that the theory assumes that actors need incentives to ensure their participation in politics. Incentives are important for why some individuals get involved and become active in a political party. However, these incentives could be divided into three: (i) process, (ii) outcomes, and (iii) ideological. Process incentives are motives for participation that are derived from the process itself. For example, some individuals are involved because of the entertainment in the process. Others because of the catharsis value in the process or because the process is interesting and stimulating or because they want to meet like-minded and interesting people. Outcome motivates people to participate because they want to achieve certain results and goals, which are often personal, such as ambition to be a councillor, LGA chairman, member of legislature, etc. Others may want party nominations into different boards and councils, or they want

business connections. The list is endless as expected outcomes for participation. This is where political parties are distinctively a key—providing incentives of process and outcomes. And, certainly, this is where youth in Nigeria find it hurdles to break and get truly politically involved. This also explains the origin and development of the “Not Too Young to Run Bill”¹ passed by the National Assembly. The last incentive is ideology, which motivates individuals to participate (see Seyd and Whiteley 1992; Whiteley, Seyd, and Richardson 1994; Whiteley et al. 1994; Whiteley and Seyd 1998). Without much ado, the importance of the incentive of ideology as a motivating factor in youth political participation in Nigeria is marginal.

1 [The bill was passed by the National Assembly in July 2017 and signed into law by the President on May 31, 2018, to alter Sections 65, 106, 131, 177 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). It was to reduce the age qualification for president from 40 to 30; governor from 35 to 30; senator from 35 to 30; House of Representatives membership from 30 to 25 and State House of Assembly membership from 30 to 25. The new law is aimed at relaxing some of the stringent and discriminatory provisions of the constitution.]

PART III



RESEARCH METHODOLOGY



3.1 Research Methodology: Mixed Methods Approach

There is of course no single accepted way of conducting research. The ways researchers carry out their research depend upon a variety of factors. These factors, according to Snape and Spencer (2003: 1), include: researchers' beliefs about the nature of the social world and what can be known about it (ontology), the nature of knowledge and how it can be acquired (epistemology), the purposes and goals of the research, the characteristics of the research participants, the audience for the research, the financiers of the research, and the position and environment of the researchers themselves. In this context, mixed method is selected as the most suitable method of conducting this study on youth political participation in Sokoto. This is otherwise known as concurrent triangulation strategy. It is selected because it provides the opportunity not only to use both quantitative and qualitative data, but essentially because it helps in covering a wide range of population, which increases our confidence in the data inferences and it also on the other hand enables the researchers through qualitative instruments to interact with respondents in also to appreciate their differentiated socio-political, psychological and moral experiences, norms and values. Thus, mixed methods research design involves the use of a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, which produces results more than what individual method could provide (Cresswell, 2003; Morgan, 1998; Lieberman, 2005). It is also good for triangulations (Jick, 1979). According to Cresswell et al (2000:7), mixed methods approach:

[...] holds the potential for rigorous, methodologically sound studies [and involves] integrating quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis

in a single study or a program of inquiry. This form of research is more than simply collecting both quantitative and qualitative data; it indicates that data will be integrated, related, or mixed at some stage of the research process.... When used in combination, both quantitative and qualitative data yield a more complete analysis, and they complement each other.

Owing to the general limitations of quantitative methods in capturing the "fabric of global phenomena that include complex interactions of culture, institutions, societal norms and government regulations, among a few concerns" (Kiesling and Harvey, 2005:22, emphasis added) and the necessity to understand informants' perceptions about various factors that will be employed simultaneously with qualitative method.

Quantitative method is meant to bridge the gap created by qualitative techniques. Bryman (2004: 46) maintains that a qualitative approach to research delineates "an approach to the study of the social world which seeks to describe and analyse the culture and behaviour of humans and their groups from the point of view of those being studied." Strauss and Corbin (1990: 17) conceive it as "any type of research that produces findings not arrived at by statistical procedures or other means of quantification." In other words, in investigating the issues of youth political participation within the scope of structure and agencies of socialisation, institutions, etc. one must delve into the context and interact with youth, politicians, political parties and other political architects of political participations to critically understand their views, attitudes and experiences on specific issues regarding youth political participation, social norms and the institutional issues that are largely non-statistical constructs, hence not easily amenable to quantification. Also, in this kind of research, defining a statistical sample is very difficult if not impossible. The process of youth

political participation and the nature of the institutions and structural agencies of political participation through which youth are cultured are dynamic. This dynamism and difference can only be adequately captured by qualitative techniques. This is because quantitative method does allow deeper interactions between the researcher and the research, thereby ignoring the dynamism to be captured in the process of such interactions.

Moreover, socio-cultural issues, norms, economy, politics and other idiosyncratic variables and related to youth political participation can only be captured and investigated through mixed methods because of its flexibility and depth in capturing these complexities. Importantly, employing this approach provides the benefits of complementarities of the two distinct methods and especially in ensuring "methodological rigour as well as measures for reliability and validity" (Kießling and Harvey, 2005). In fact, according to Cresswell (2003:217) mixed methods strategy enables integration of interpretation, which "can either note the convergence of the findings as a way to strengthen the knowledge claims of the study or explain any lack of convergence that may result. [Thus it] can result in well-validated and substantiated findings." Indeed, mixed methods according to Cresswell (2003) is suitable for research with shorter fieldwork duration and tied to a limited time frame and resources. This justifiably addresses this study on youth political participation Sokoto.

Moreover, qualitative techniques are suitable for their taking on-board people's experiences and the meaning they individually or collectively attach to the dynamism of youth political participation within the context of Nigeria's democratic processes. This approach, with its characteristics of profundity and thoroughness, is more particularistic about contextual issues (Devine, 2002: 199) structural agencies of socialisation, institutions, values, adaptability and electoral system design. This

will be done by placing informants' attitudes and behaviour in the context of their individual experiences and the wider social, economic and political settings under which participation takes place and political institutions operate. This is a holistic approach that captures the meanings, divergent views, process and context (Bryman, 1988: 62; Devine, 2002: 199), that are the defining elements of the study of youth political participation in relation to structural agencies of socialisation, institutions and electoral system design.

The study will adopt an inductive approach in which "theory and evidence are interwoven to create a unified whole; and the concepts and generalisations are wedded to their context" (Neuman, 2003:79). Contrastingly, quantitative methods are relevant for theory testing or verification and hypothesis testing (Cresswell, 2003; Montiel, 1998). Moreover, quantitative techniques assume a "universal paradigm" that "uses evidence to test generalisations of an abstract and law-like character and tends towards acceptance of convergence" (Kießling and Harvey, 2005:30). Quantitative approach is positivist and deductive in nature. Positivist approach is limited compared to interpretivist, as the latter is more "sensitive to context" (Neuman, 2003:80). Due to its sensitivity to context, interpretive approach has "limited generalisations", which are context specific. This suffices to say that the study is premised on the epistemological and ontological perspectives and assumptions of positivism and interpretive social science (Neuman, 1994; Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Lee, 1991; Streubert and Carpenter 1999; Checkland and Scholes, 1990; Newman, 1994; Hussey and Hussey, 1997; Ogundiya and Kura, 2009). Generally, quantitative data and analysis are suitable to case studies only when they are "not too complex" (Gillham, 2000:80). Using quantitative technique suits this research, as the issue being studied seems somewhat less complex. That is why simple descriptive statistics, such as percentages, averages, totals, etc., are relevant in this study

as against technically complicated inferential statistics that deal with complex correlations (KieSSLing and Harvey, 2005). Nevertheless, qualitative methods, as explained earlier will add value to the data and findings by its ability to capture complex socio-cultural issues, "people's experiences and gives meaning to events, processes and the environment of their normal setting" (KieSSLing and Harvey, 2005:30). Thus, mixed method approach, case study design and the variety of data collection instruments will help to collect large volume of data, which will ensure adequate analysis and presentation of credible findings on youth political participation in Sokoto.

3.2 Instruments of Data Collection

For the qualitative approach, semi-structured interviews will be conducted with relevant structural agencies of socialisation, such as the family, media, institutions, such as political parties, key political figures and leaders of selected youth organisations, CBOs and NGOs. Similarly, as part of the qualitative approach to the study, documentary analysis will be employed. This a situation where relevant documents, such as newspapers, books, journals, party documents and electoral data, electoral acts, etc. will be critically analysed in relation to the major objectives of the study. Questionnaires will be administered to youth to determine factors influencing their political participation. While, discourse analysis will be employed in analysing the qualitative primary data, simple arithmetical calculations will be used in analysing data generated from the questionnaire survey.

3.3 Sample and

Sampling Method

To ensure the fecundity of the data, purposive sampling will be used to determine the interviewees and Focus Group Discussion (FGD). This is a qualitative sampling technique where respondents are selected based on their demonstrable membership of certain group or community (Higginbotton, 2004:13). It is a method where research participants are selected based on predetermined criteria relevant to the study (Patton, 2002). This sampling method is the best instrument in choosing the appropriate respondents who will provide the data appropriately needed for this research (Patton, 2002). This is because, given the theoretical framework and objectives of the research, selected family members, political office holders, politicians, heads of institutions, CBOs, NGOs, media, youth, etc. are the most appropriate respondents that could provide useful information on the process of the role of structural agencies of socialisation, political figure 'controlling the gate' and institutions in youth political participation. It is also the best sampling technique for accommodating the snowballing strategy in further contacting other relevant informants. This snowballing technique through which more informants are recruited as the research progresses and perhaps as preliminary findings emerge is also known as theoretical sampling (Higginbotton, 2004:13). The combination of purposive sampling and snowballing technique will help tremendously in getting the relevant data necessary for this study. Thus, it is the most effective means of "contacting hidden, hard-to-reach groups" (Streeton et al, 2004:37) such as Nigerian politicians and electoral officials. In this context, Coyne (1997) labelled all qualitative research samplings as purposive samplings. However, though Moser and Kalton (1971: 54) have refuted the viability of purposive sampling for its lack of rigour, required in empirical research, still it is the most relevant and available technique for the selection of

informants with specialist knowledge and qualities, which otherwise could not be selected if other methods are used (such as random or stratified sampling). In quantitative approach, cluster and purposive sampling will be used simultaneously to select LGAs and respondents. Accordingly, to ensure that a representative cross-section of Sokoto State is covered, two (2) LGAs will be purposively selected from each of the three (3) Senatorial Zones. See Table 1 below.

Table 3.1: Sokoto State Senatorial Districts

S/N	LGAs/Sokoto East Senatorial District	LGAs/Sokoto North Senatorial District	LGAs/Sokoto South Senatorial District
1	Gada	Binji	Bodinga
2	Goronyo	Gudu	Dange-Shuni
3	Gwadabawa	Kware	Kebbe
4	Illela	Silame	Shagari
5	Isa	Sokoto North	Tambuwal
6	Raba	Sokoto South	Tureta
7	Sabon Birni	Tangaza	Yabo
8	Wurno	Wamakko	
Sampled LGA for Research			
	Wurno	Sokoto North	Tambuwal
	Gwadabawa	Wamakko	Dange-Shuni

Secondly, there is no generally acceptable sample size for qualitative research. Sample size in qualitative studies is a matter of judgement. It is determined by the quality of information obtained, the research method, sampling procedure and the objective of the research (Sandelowski, 1995: 163). However, Morse (1995: 147) argues that data saturation is the best method for determining sample size in qualitative studies, though "there are no published guidelines or test of adequacy for estimating the sample size required to reach saturation." Different scholars have recommended different sample sizes needed to achieve saturation. For example, Bertaux (1981) suggests fifteen to be the smallest acceptable sample size. Morse (1994: 225) argues that at least six respondent are

enough for phenomenological studies, thirty-five for ethnographic, grounded theory and ethnoscience researches, and a massive sum of one to two hundred for qualitative ethology. But Creswell (1998) recommends between five and twenty-five interviews for phenomenological studies and between twenty and thirty for grounded theory. Sandelowski (1995: 162) suggests that grounded theory studies should have a sample of between thirty and fifty interviews and/or observations. In view of the nature of the phenomenon of the study and the variation in the methods to be used, ten (5) interviews shall be conducted in each selected LGA, which would give a total of Thirty (30) KIs. This will help in achieving informational redundancy (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) and theoretical saturation (Strauss and Corbin,

1990), which are necessary for generalisation and drawing relevant conclusions. The yardstick used for measuring redundancy and saturation was the point when more interviews could not generate new information (Guest et al, 2006: 65). Thus, both sampling technique and sample size will be determined by the research topic, the aims of the study and "feasibility, cost and time available" (Berkowitz, 2006: 2) to do the fieldwork and complete the study.

Leaders and members of selected youth organisations will be randomly selected for the questionnaire distribution and application. Systematic random sampling will be used in questionnaire distribution. Accordingly, two (2) LGA will be purposively selected in each Senatorial Zone and 400 (399.9715211) questionnaires will be applied in each LGA (see Table 2 below for sample size). This will bring the total questionnaires to 2,400 for analysis. This is not too small, as quantitative data will only be used to support qualitative analysis. The following Yamane (1967) formula was employed to determine the sample size, which is representative of the overall Sokoto State population for 2020 estimate and as representative for each LGA (see Table 3.2 and 3.3. below).

$$n = \frac{N}{\left[1 + N(e^2) \right]}$$

Table 3.2: Sokoto State Projected Population for 2020 based on 0.03 Growth rate & Sampling Size

SN	Senatorial District	LGA	Total Pop 2020	Selected LGA	Total Pop 2020	Sampled
1	SOKOTO EAST	Gada	377256.6622	Gwadabawa	351561.7095	399.5454051
2		Goronyo	277009.0126	Wurno	246634.8669	399.3523181
3		Gwadabawa	351561.7095			
4		Illela	228676.5643			
5		Isa	222011.4651			
6		Rabah	226664.4589			
7		Sabon Birni	315459.0892			
8		Wurno	246634.8669			
1	SOKOTO NORTH	Binji	159594.279	Wamakko	272941.573	399.4146518

2		Gudu	145184.67	Sokoto North	353822.7081	399.5483068
3		Kware	203467.6084			
4		Silame	158607.8758			
5		Sokoto North	353822.7081			
6		Sokoto South	296182.9623			
7		Tangaza	173005.695			
8		Wamakko	272941.573			
1	SOKOTO SOUTH	Bodinga	266539.7768	Dange-Shuni	295623.6075	399.4595026
2		Dange-Shuni	295623.6075	Tambuwal	341795.9245	399.5324316
3		Kebbe	189424.7895			
4		Shagari	237678.64			
5		Tambuwal	341795.9245			
6		Tureta	103891.9706			
7		Yabo	174766.2873			
		TOTAL	5617802.196			

Table 3.3: Sokoto State Projected Population for 2020 based on 0.03 Growth rate

s/n	LGAs	Total Pop 2020	Sample
1	Binji	159594.279	398.9999642
2	Bodinga	266539.7768	399.4006139
3	Dange/ Shuni	295623.6075	399.4595026
4	Gada	377256.6622	399.5763348
5	Goronyo	277009.0126	399.4232343
6	Gwadabawa	351561.7095	399.5454051
7	Gudu	145184.67	398.9009832
8	Illela	228676.5643	399.3015436
9	Isa	222011.4651	399.2806126
10	Kebbe	189424.7895	399.1571175
11	Kware	203467.6084	399.2151769
12	Rabah	226664.4589	399.2953543
13	Sabon-Birni	315459.0892	399.493445
14	Shagari	237678.64	399.3279532
15	Silame	158607.8758	398.9937605
16	Sokoto North	353822.7081	399.5483068

17	Sokoto South	296182.9623	399.4605219
18	Tambuwa	341795.9245	399.5324316
19	Tangaza	173005.695	399.0773083
20	Tureta	103891.9706	398.4658455
21	Wamako	272941.573	399.4146518
22	Wurno	246634.8669	399.3523181
23	Yabo	174766.2873	399.0865822
TOTAL		5617802.196	399.9715211

Source: Nigerian Bureau of Statistics.

3.4 Data Analysis: Key Informant Interviews (KII)

The interview data will be subjected to systematic utilisation, critical scrutiny, and analysis, thereby reducing and/or minimizing ambiguity and biases. The interviews will be recorded. At least 5 KIIs and 1 FGDs will be conducted in each LGA. This will give a total of 30 KIIs and 6 FGDs will be conducted. The data will then be transcribed and later typed (as the two cannot be done simultaneously) to ensure consistency and accuracy. In addition to recording the interviews, notes will be taken. Some researchers undertake their data reduction (weeding-out) during the transcription stage (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Emerson et al., 1995); that is, they decide what to transcribe and what not. Thus, the weeding process will be conducted during coding stage and in the process of writing up. Thus, the interviews will be transcribed in their entirety and a verbatim account provided to ensure comprehensiveness. Indeed, as noted by McIllelan et al. (2003: 66), this is a very tasking exercise due to speech elision, overlapping speech, background noises, etc. The supplementary notes of interviews will assist


in overcoming these challenges. The data will then be coded in accordance with the major themes and sub-themes that would emerge thereof. Indeed, the themes and sub-themes will be generated based on the objectives and research questions of the study. This is to avoid derailing from the main context of the research. Strauss and Corbin (1990: 62) describe it as a system where "...the data are broken down into discrete parts, closely examined for similarities and differences, and questions are asked about the phenomena as reflected in the data. Through this process, one's own and others' assumptions about phenomena are questioned or explored leading to new discoveries" (see also, Aberbach and Rockman, 2004:1-6). In this study, following three stages by Connolly (2003: 103-112), four levels of qualitative data analysis will be employed. These stages are the transcription stage, the generative phase, the interpretive phase and the theorising phase. In the generative phase, careful examination of the data generated through the interviews sentence-by-sentence, paragraph-by-paragraph, or even word-by-word will be done. This would enable us to figure out and explore general meanings and thrust of the data thereby coding the data accordingly.

In the generative stage, the coded data will be constructed into themes and sub-themes in order to synthesise the data to "[weed] the

significant from the insignificant" (Morse, 1994: 30). The interpretive stage involves a reducible process. This is where themes and sub-themes will systematically be reduced or translated into 'conceptual categories' (Connolly, 2003: 109). Then, patterns and relationships between themes will be established and conceptually put together. This will further help in the "process of configuration from the particular to the general – from the detail coding of the particular, towards the grouping of themes, becoming increasingly distant from the particular towards the more general and abstract. This will provide a greater freedom to consider the categories in different ways,

exploring alternative meanings, and new understandings" (Connolly, 2003: 110). This process will help in further confirming the categories by simply returning to the whole process repeatedly. Confirmation of the categories, according to Connolly, always increases the grounded validity of the findings, i.e., findings are critically and systematically grounded in the data (Connolly, 2003: 110). In the theorising stage, theoretical explanations will accordingly be constructed. The whole process will enable the development of consistent explanations, based on the research questions and objectives.

Figure 3.2: Four Stages of Qualitative Data Analysis



Source: Adopted from Connolly (2003)

Different approaches to qualitative data analysis exist in social sciences. These approaches have been extensively discussed (see for example, Bryman and Burgess, 1994; Coffey and Atkinson, 1996; Dey, 1993; Strauss 1987; Boulton and Hammersley, 1996; Walsh, 2003; Welsh, 2002). However, there are three perspectives to qualitative analysis: literal, interpretive and reflective (Mason, 1996: 54). Whatever perspective a researcher takes, s/he is engrained in either manual or computer assisted methods (May, 2002). Computer assisted qualitative data analysis (CAQDA) programmes include ATLAS.ti, The Ethnograph, HyperQual, HyperRESEARCH, NUD.IST and NVivo. In view of the nature of this study both manual and computer-assisted programme of NUD.IST Vivo (NVivo) will employed. This

software will be used because of its potential for addressing some shortcomings of other packages and is relatively easier to use (May, 2002). Although it has been argued that CAQDA could distance the researcher from the data and might encourage quantitative analysis of qualitative data, thereby changing the meaning and focus of the research (Barry, 1998, Hinchliffe et al., 1997), nevertheless, the use of manual and CAQDA simultaneously will assist in providing accurate and adequate analysis of the data. This will involve the use of a word processor for cut-and-paste or copy-and-paste. This method will also make it easier for reorganising the data "into themes, identifying patterns within it" (Burnard, 1994: 33-4), and in determining and counting "who said what and when, which in turn provides a

reliable, general picture of the data" (May, 2002) for quality analysis and drawing conclusion. This method will also make it relatively easy in ensuring rigour and trustworthiness in the data and will consequently add value to reliability and validity dimensions of the study.

3.5 Data Analysis: Questionnaires

To simplify the process of analysing the questionnaire data, the questions will be synthesised into variable labels, which will be used to analyse the data. The synthesis will be done in such a way that the content of the questions and the responses would not change. The questions will be used to create the variable labels, which will capture the main thrust of the questions. Similarly, for open-ended questions (where possible) factors that captured the main responses of the people will be used to group these responses and clearly record them under appropriate variable(s). This process will make it relatively easier to capture all responses in the questionnaire irrespective of how they will be made, and without changing the meaning of the data. With this, it will be easy to code, conduct computer analysis and interpret the data more scientifically. Simple descriptive statistics will be used for presentation and interpreting the results.

These elements will broadly speaking, form the major determining factors for understanding and quantitatively measuring youth participation in politics, not only on its own merit, but also within the broader framework of structural agencies, institutions, electoral designs and pathways. The questionnaire data will be scientifically analysed with the use of SPSS. This computer assisted method is simpler to use and more important in making all kinds of statistical tabulations, analysis and even interpretation of the results.

Overall, Correlation Analysis will be used in the analysis and interpretation of the Quantitative data. In particular, Spearman Rank Correlation Technique will be professionally employed. This will give accurate and scientific measurement of youth political participation within the context of institutions, structures and agencies and dominant political actors as engaging factors of political participation in Sokoto.

PART IV



YOUTH POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN SOKOTO: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS



4.1 Introduction

Youth have become the central focal human element in any discussion regarding democratic governance either in terms of its challenges or searching for ways to advance its progress or both. In examining various issues concerning youth political participation in Sokoto, especially for the purpose of making key policy recommendations, this section presents and analyse key empirical data collected through the applications of Survey Questionnaires, Key Informant Interviews (KII), Focus Group Discussions (FGD), observations and field notes. Table 1 presents distributions of Survey Questionnaires across Sokoto state.

Table 4.1: Distribution of Respondents by Zone and by Sex

SENATORIAL ZONE	No. of Questionnaires Distributed in each Senatorial Zone	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
Sokoto Central	800	489	290	779
Sokoto South	800	442	363	805
Sokoto East	800	560	253	813
TOTAL	2,400	1491	906	2397

The table indicates that a total of 2,400 questionnaires were distributed across three senatorial zones (i.e. 400 in each Local Government Area). However, 2,397 were retrieved, cleared and analysed. Similarly, in each of the six LGAs, 5 KIIs and 1 FGD were conducted. It is these huge empirical data that are presented and analysed here to enable scientific appreciation of youth political participation in Sokoto state.


youth in which age is a major determinant of its classification, the issue of age is a critical factor. Figure 4.1 provides data on Age and Sex distribution of respondents. Accordingly, the data indicated that 38% of the respondents were female, while 62% were male. The participation of women in the study is very appreciative, especially in state where women are marginalised in all spheres of women endeavour, especially in education and political participation. However, the raw data in the figure showed that 584 respondents were female of 17-30 years and 874 were male of the same age bracket, 239 and 506 were of the age bracket of 31-40 years, female and male respectively. Overall, 915 were female and 1,482 were male respondents of this survey. Although, no bias was held constant against female, nevertheless, this is a normal pattern especially in state like Sokoto, with apparent bias against women political participation.

4. 2. Socio-Economic Characteristics of Respondents

4.2.1 Sex and Age Distributions of Respondent

In every empirical research, especially on


Figure 4.1: Distribution of Respondents by Age and Sex



4.2.2 Religious Affiliation of Respondents

Figure 4.2 shows data for religious affiliation respondents. The figure indicates that 92% of the total respondents were Muslims and affiliated to Islam. Only 8% were non-Muslims, and therefore, belonged to Christianity and other religions.

Figure 4.2: Religion of Respondents



The data in figure 4.2 did not strike any surprise. This is largely because Sokoto state has historically been a Muslim dominated state. The famous Usmanu Danfodiyo Jihad of 1804 and subsequent establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate had succeeded in consolidating

Islam in the state and elsewhere. Thus, any analysis of the socio-economic and political issues of the people must take the input of Islam into critical perspective. This explains the marginal political participation of female youth in Sokoto, as it is controversially and

arguably claimed by many Muslim schools that Islam abhors women political participation, a view, which is subscribed by majority of the Muslim people of the state, such Qur'anic and Islamiyya Schools. Despite series of orientation and mobilisation programmes, still the role of women in politics has been limited to voting only.

4.2.3 Tribe and Levels of Education

The study seeks to capture the ethnic groups and levels of education of respondents. Table 4.2 indicates that of the total 2,385 respondents 1,699 considered themselves as Hausa, 362 were Fulani, 209 Yoruba, 64 Igbos and 54 others. Thus, the dominant ethnic groups were, therefore, Hausa and Fulani. Of these numbers, 410 had Qur'anic education, 161 primary education, 473 secondary education

and a total of 1,320 respondents had tertiary education. While only 27 respondents had none. When these figures are crossed against ethnic groups, 330 Hausas had Qur'anic education, 103 primary education, 359 secondary education and 894 had tertiary education. This is against the Igbos, which had only 2 with Qur'anic education, zero primary education, 14 secondary education and 48 tertiary education. This shows the dominance of Hausa-Fulani in Sokoto state, their Islamic religious affiliation as majority of them had Qur'anic education and that majority of the respondents are generally educated. This is expected, as the focal areas of this study are headquarters of selected LGAs and tertiary institutions. These are the only places where the target population of youth could be easily located.

Table 4.2: Distribution of Respondent based on Tribe and Level of Education

TRIBE	LEVEL OF EDUCATION					Total
	Qur'anic Education	Primary Education	Secondary Education	Tertiary	None	
Hausa	330	103	359	894	13	1699
Fulani	70	34	62	196	0	362
Yoruba	8	19	31	141	13	209
Igbo	2	0	14	48	0	64
Others	0	5	7	41	1	54
TOTAL	410	161	473	1320	0	2385

4.2.4: Occupational Distribution of Respondents by Level of Education

Very interesting cross-tabulation is for education and occupations. Accordingly, 579 respondents were students and could, therefore, not be cross-tabulated with any occupation. Nevertheless, 451 respondents with tertiary education were civil servants, 41 were farmers, 138 were doing various businesses, and 37 were artisans. Those respondents with only Qur’anic education, the highest number of 199 were farmers and those with primary education, the highest of 84 respondents were into small businesses. This shows the importance of education to the nature of occupation of respondents. Figure 4.4 and Table 4.3 provide a detailed data on distribution of education by level of education.

Figure 4.3. Occupational Distribution of Respondents by Level of Education




Table 4.3: Occupational Distribution of Respondents by Level of Education


Occupation	LEVEL OF EDUCATION					Total
	None	Primary Education	Qur'anic Education	Secondary Education	Tertiary Education	
Artisan	-	1	4	19	37	61
Business	12	17	64	69	138	300
Civil Servant	1	8	50	54	451	564
Farming	3	35	199	63	58	358
Others	7	16	34	25	41	123
Student	1	84	53	241	579	958
Grand Total	24	161	404	471	1304	2364

Thus, the higher the level of education of individual youth, the higher the tendency of him/her to be a civil servant or engage in white collar occupation, and correspondingly, the higher the probability of that individual to be politically aware, political engage and politically participate. For this, education must always be an instrument of political mobilisation, enlightenment, orientation and overall political engagement and participation and of improvement in income and living standard of the citizenry.

4.2.6: Occupational Distribution of Respondents by Sex

Figure 4.5 shows the data for occupational distribution of respondents by sex. It indicates that majority of the youth under this study were students, 440 and 530, female and male, respectively. Thus, 334 and 221 youth civil servants were male and female working in various government agencies. And 226 and 72 male and female youth respectively were engaged in various small businesses and 115 female and 243 male were farmers. This explains that while still students were in the majority but at least each of the respondents seems to somewhat have an income generating activity, which could improve his/her living standard vis-à-vis political participation in Sokoto State. This is if all other factors of political participation are held constant.

Figure 4.4: Occupational Distribution by Sex




4.2.7: Level of Income of Respondents

Figure 4.5 is symbolically self-explanatory. The data shows that 29% of respondents' monthly income is less than N10,000 only, 21% had between N10,000 and N20,000 monthly, 20% had between N20,000 and N30,000 and only 30% of respondents had somewhat more than N30,000 monthly income. The income level of youth in Sokoto clearly is not encouraging for their level of political participation. Even though as indicated earlier, majority of the

respondents are students, however, their level of income indicates the relative poorness of their income, which would negatively affect their level of political participation. The general social needs and objective reality of the Nigerian economy indicates that about 70% of youth (respondents) in Sokoto State would find it difficult to take care of their social needs, which would adversely affect their political engagement and participation. Theoretical and empirical studies have also elsewhere supported this empirical claim.

Figure 4.5: Level of Income of Respondents



4.3. Political Parties and Social Media and Youth Political Participation

Political parties are most important pillars of political participations. They instrumentalise democracy and democratic governance. Members of society create parties and platforms for political competitions. Individuals join parties and the first level of their substantive political participation. Accordingly, political parties compete in elections political

power. People of different levels and classes are involved in different types of work of one political party or another. Political parties increase people's awareness. People's political role depends on the economic, social and political outlook of the political party and its relationship with the political system.

4.3.1 Respondents Support for Political Party

One critical way of participating in politics is being a supporter of a political party regardless of being a registered member or not. Figure 4.6 and Table 4.4 provide data for respondents' support of a political party.

Figure 4.6: Respondents' Support for Political Party




Table 4.4: Respondents' Support for Political Party

Political Party	Frequency	Percentage (%)
APC	945	40.58
PDP	811	34.82
Labour Party	499	21.43
NNPP	9	0.39
PRP	11	0.47
ZLP	1	0.04
Accord Party	1	0.04
SRP	1	0.04
APGA	1	0.04
Others	50	2.15
Total	2,329	100

The data showed impressively that an overwhelming support for various political parties. It indicated that 40.58% of respondents support All Progressive Congress (APC), 34.82% support People's Democratic Party (PDP, and 21.43% support Labour Party (LP). Overall, 96.83 support political parties. This indicated a very good political aware awareness and even participation. Accordingly, all the survey respondents support political parties. This is by extension a support to democratic system of government despite poor government performance. By this measure, one could infer that youth are strongly in support of democratic values and system of governance. Support is an indication of interest and awareness. To buttress this point further, the study seeks to understand respondents' statutory status with political parties.

4.3.2: Respondents' Registration with Political Parties

Distribution of members of political parties that are Registered members							
Are you a registered member of Political Party? (1=Yes, 2=No)							
	APC	PDP	ZLP	NNPP	PRP	Others	TOTAL
YES	217	265	01	9	2	19	512 (42.8%)
NO	299	332	1	3	2	4	682 (57.2%)

The data illustratively show an impressive number of youths being members of political parties. The data indicates that 512, which represents 42.8%) respondents were registered members of political parties, while 682 (57.2%)

were not. Of this figure, 217 and 265, were members of APC and PDP, respectively. For example, Nasiru Umar claimsthat "Most of us are members of political parties but till date, we are only used by the party to garner more


votes, win election and get more and more money" (FGD, 2022). These are the dominant political parties in Sokoto State, which alternately has been holding power. The data show and further corroborate respondents' support for political parties, their level of political awareness and even greater interest in political participation. For example, Umar Aminu states that:

Political parties are the major ingredients of politics. In Nigeria, a person can only participate actively in politics through a political party. Political parties serve as the identity of candidates. A candidate can only be recognised if he contests under a political party. Therefore, the role of political parties is enormous. As you are seeing me here, ***I am a registered member of my party the PDP and I wanted to contest, but was asked to wait for my turn. Since my party declined to support me, I think it will be risky if I go ahead with my plan. Political parties therefore have their roles (sic) (Emphasis added, Umar Aminu, KII, 2022).***

4.3.3 Reasons for Not Registering with a Political Party

Of the total number of respondents of 682 (57.2) that are registered members of any political party, Figure 4.7 provides data on such reasons for not registering with any political party.

Figure 4.7: Reasons for Not Registering with a Political Party




The data highlighted that 26% did not register because it was difficult to register, 21% could not afford registration fee, 18% because of fear of political violence, 16% did not believe in the political values of those parties, and the remaining 10% were simply not interested in all the political parties. Overall, these factors, though very important in undermining youth's interest in political parties, however, when combine with other factors could truncate any interest in political participation.

4.3.4 Respondents' Participation in Political Party Activities

Supporting a political party and registering with a political party are basic elements of political participation. When individuals support and register with parties, it indicates readiness to partake in political activities of political parties or the overall political spectrum of the democratic processes. In this way, Figure 4.8 presents data on various ways through which youth have been participating in political party activities.

Figure 4.8: Respondents Participation in Political Party Activities




The data were multi-coded responses. It indicated that an overwhelming 1,040 had not participated in any political party activities. However, 493, 270, 485, had participated in party campaigns, congresses and party meetings, respectively, and 156 and 375 had participated in fund raising and membership mobilisation, respectively. Overall, majority of the respondents had actually participated in different political party activities. This is also impressive, even though such participation has not led to actual contest and of being a party flag bearer in any state or national election. This level of participation is a clear pointer that majority of youth in Sokoto participate in general elections as voters and supporters of party candidates.

4.3.5 Reasons for Non-Participation in Party Activities

For those 1,040 responses for non-participation in political party activities, the study seeks to examine reasons for such endeavours. Figure 4.9 shows the data for respondents' non-participation in party activities.

Figure 4.9: Reasons for Non-Participation in Party Activities




Accordingly, the data indicated and perhaps corroborated the empirical characteristics of Nigerian political space. For example, it shows that youth, for various reasons, are apathetic towards political party activities as majority of the respondents indicated "not interested in party activities," 541 were not participating largely "due to violence," and 282 because they were "not allowed to participate." These are fundamentally the basic reasons why majority of Nigerians do not participate in political party activities. But when these data are cross-tabulated with level of education, the empirical evidence is well convincing. Table 4.6 provides data on reasons for non-participation in political party activities by level of education.

Table 4.6: Reasons for Non-Participation in Political Activity by Level of Education

Educational Qualification	Due to violence	Not Interested	Not Allowed	Others	Total
Qur'anic Education	107	121	41	23	292
Primary Education	47	38	39	4	128
Secondary Education	105	196	70	9	380
Tertiary Education	280	498	138	31	947
None	11	9	1	1	22
Total	550	862	289	68	1765

The data show that majority of respondents of 947 with tertiary education did not participate because of violence and not interested. This category of respondents is somewhat more informed and could therefore take rational decisions. The rationality for non-participation was to avoid violence. Of the total 380 respondents with secondary education, 105 and 196 were also not participating due to violence and disinterest, respectively. Similar figure is obtained for those with Qur’anic education. In summary, it could be argued that the overall reason for non-participation in political party activities is political violence that often dominates all aspects of political party activities in Sokoto State. Again, when the data is cross-tabulated with age, more empirical findings are revealed. Figure 4.10 presents data on reasons for non-participation inn political party activity by age.

Figure 4.10: Reasons for Non-Participation in Political Activities by Age




From the symbolic presentation, it is very clear that even from the perspective of age, youth between the ages of 17 and 30years and 31 and 40 years were not participating in party activities largely due to violence and disinterest. Thus, the question of political violence in the activities of political parties is very critical. Everywhere during electioneering people, activities of political parties are always dotted and punctuated by violence. Some youth (largely uneducated and poor) are used by politicians as vanguards of violence.

4.3.6 Reasons for Participating in Political Party Activities

At this juncture, the study examines reasons for participating in political party activities. The idea is not only to measure but also to identify motivating factors for such participations. This would help in isolating positive factors that could be improved to further strengthen youth participation in party activities. Figure 4.11 presents statistical data to this effect.

Figure 4.11: Reasons for Participating in Political Party Activities



Accordingly, the data show that 33% of respondents, which represents the majority participated in party activities to simply support their parties. This is followed by 19% respondents who did so because of they were registered members of political parties. This is against the 9%, 12% and 17% who participated because of the reasons of supporting friends, to get money and for a family member of being a member of political party, respectively. Thus, when combined, it could be argued that about 52% of respondents participated in party activities for rational reasons of supporting and being registered members of political parties. This also supports the earlier empirical testimonies of the key role of parties as pillars of youth political participation. In fact, it is not an exaggeration to stress that parties are the gatekeepers of youth political parties. The symbolically presented empirical data presented and analysed here attest to this scientific claim.

4.3.7 Ownership of Voter's Card


The next most important element of political parties, irrespective of being a registered member of a political party is voting. Voting is an expression of civic duties and obligation. It midwives the establishment of a democratic government and directly links citizens to their government. It gives legitimacy of elected government and through it citizens could hold their government to account. Broadly speaking, Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948 stipulates that:

[...]the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot or by equivalent free voting procedures.

Everyone has the right to take part in the

government of his/her country, directly or through freely chosen representative. Voting as a civic duty brings tangible benefit to democratic governance. More so, because voting is perhaps the only method through which people elect their representatives. Broadly speaking, voting is a method for a group or society or an electorate to decide or express an opinion regarding public policies or candidates contesting, elections. Similarly, a vote is an individual's act of voting, by which he/she expresses support or preference for a certain issue, a candidate, a political party, etc. (Kura, 2011; Akande, 2011). To vote one must satisfy certain criteria, such as being eligible by age and registering to collecting voting card as an instrument of election. Figure 4.11, therefore, presents statistical data regarding respondents' registration and ownership of voting card.

Figure 4.11: Respondents' Ownership of Voting Card



The data show an impressive performance in the respondents' ownership of voting card in Sokoto State. This statistics support data on election turnout, which as always, been higher by youth in the state. In other words, in 2015 and 2019 elections youth have recorded an impressive turnout during election. This further indicated political awareness of youth in Sokoto. The data also corroborated support for political parties and registering and participating in political party activities. Despite some basic challenges of violence, which often affect youth political participation, however, the data demonstrated youth enthusiasm to politically engage and participate to the level of ownership of voting cards and even actual voting. Table 4.7 disaggregated the statistics according to Local Government Areas sampled for this study.

Table 4.7: Distribution of Respondents on Ownership of Voters Card Across the LGA

LGAs	Yes	No	Total
Sokoto North	238	141	379
Wammako	270	102	372
Tambuwal	307	77	384
Dange Shuni	313	72	385
Gwadabawa	313	109	422
Wurno	300	74	374
TOTAL	1741 (75%)	575 (25%)	2,316


The tabulated data indicated remarkable performance in the youth's ownership of voting card. In sum, Dange/Shuni and Gwadabawa LGAs had the largest with 313 each. Tambuwal follows this with 307 and Wurno with 300. Overall, 75% of the youth under this survey had registered and obtained their voting card (PVC), while only 25% had not done so. With INEC and civil society organisations' intensive campaign and mobilisation, this figure might have even reduced. For example, Sokoto has been one of the Yiaga Africa's focal states of political orientation and mobilisation. One could therefore argue that political awareness

and motivation to politically participate among the youth in Sokoto State is not only impressive but also tantalisingly encouraging.

4.3.8: Respondents' Voting in Elections

Ownership of a voting card does not guarantee actual election. Thus, the study further interrogated the respondents' history of election. This is important in order to measure actual voting by those 75% respondents who claimed to own voter's card. Figure 4.13 presents statistical data in this regard.

Figure 4.13: Distribution of Respondents with Voter's Card that Voted by LGA (in %)




The statistics is significant in that it points positively to an excellent outing. Those who owned voters' cards had gone beyond mere ownership to participate in actual election. For example, Dange/Shuni, which has the largest respondents with ownership of voters' cards, also has the largest percentage of 87.4% of youth who actually voted in previous elections. Gwadabawa and Wurno also presented good performance in this regard, with 75.4 and 73.2, respectively. Cumulatively, 68.7% of those respondents who owned voters' cards had actually voted in elections. Only 31.3% had not voted in election. Regardless, of the motivating

factor for voting, the data corroborate all the above statistical analyses.

4.3.9: Reasons for Respondents' Non-Voting in Elections

To further drive the point scientifically, the study identifies reasons for non-voting despite having voters' cards. Thus, the views of only those who had not voted in recent elections were presented here. This helps to cross-tabulate reasons for not participation in party activities.

Figure 4.14: Reasons for Non-voting by Respondents with Voters Card




No contradiction. The data scientifically buttressed earlier arguments. The main reason why despite having a voter's card, yet many youths desist from voting was political violence. The statistics shows that 659 respondents avoided voting simply because of fear of political violence. In addition to this, 463 respondents did not participate in voting because of disinterest. Other respondents, 239 of them did not vote in recent elections because of "not believing in the parties." These are rational factors that only political aware individuals could use as reason for non-voting. The same factors have been attributed to non-

engagement in political party activities. Thus, to continue to improve political participation, Government and other political stakeholders should strengthen security during the period of electioneering processes.

4.3.10 Participation in Electoral Contest

Beyond ownership of voting and participation in actual voting process, the next most important measure of youth political participation is contesting election. This is a key element of substantive political participation. Figure 4.15 presents data in this regard.

Figure 4.15: Participation in Electoral Contest




The inspiring statistical data regarding youth participation in various political party activities, including their significant number with voter's card, seems to somewhat contradict and/or insipid all enthusiasm regarding the seeming progress on issues under review. In other words, in terms of youth participating in electoral contest, the empirical data show that 72% had never participated. Only 28% claimed to have participated in electoral contest. This is worrisome and indeed, confirms the finds of other theoretical and empirical studies. There had been lamentations from youth that godfathers and other dominant political actors have dominated the political space and make their entry absolutely very difficult. Major impediments to youth participating in electoral contest are excessive use of money or high cost of political activities, including cost of party nomination forms, lack of money, illiteracy, disunity among the youth, delegate system of party primaries and congresses, etc. For example, a youth in Sokoto laments that: *"I was an aspirant for a seat at the State House of Assembly, but I could not purchase my interest form because each time I approached party's officials, they claimed that the form is not available at the moment. This denial continued*

until the deadline elapsed." For her part, Hunaiza Abubakar who clinched NRM party ticket for a House of Representatives seat stated *"nobody wanted to give me a chance. They called me unprintable names, and even queried my guts to get involved in politics that's mainly dominated by males."* Umar Dan-Khalifa had a different story. *"My challenge was because I contested on a smaller political party who did not have wider acceptability from the electorates. That was why I lost in the election."* There are, therefore, multiple layers of problems affecting youth actual political participation in electoral contest.

4.3.11 Reasons for Participating in Electoral Contest

The 28% of respondents who claimed to have participated in elections provided reasons for doing so. This is to help in clearly distilling those factors that influence youth political participation and to provide policy recommendations for continuing to improve such substantive level of political participation. Figure 4.16 provides empirical evidence in this regard.

Figure 4.16: Reason for Contesting Electoral Post




This is a multi-code variable. Accordingly, the main reasons why youth participate in electoral contest are to represent their community with 419 entries, godfather support with 398 and to bring change with 232 entries. Other reasons are to have access to political power with 115 entries and to get money with 194 entries. Overall, logically substantial number of those able to participate in electoral contest does so for functional reasons—to bring change and to represent communities. Lots of work must be done to further open the political space for the youth to substantively participate. Youth must also be oriented towards appreciating the

functional role of participation itself beyond mere parochial and clientelist reasons.

4.3.12 Reasons for Non-Participation in Electoral Contest

To balance the analysis, the study appreciates the views of the majority 72% that did not participate in electoral contest regarding the key impediments blocking their aspirations to politically engage at this substantive level of politics. Figure 4.17 provides evidence, accordingly.

Figure 4.17: Reasons for Non-Participation in Electoral Contest



Again, this is a multi-coded variable and scientifically supports all the other empirical findings regarding factors impeding youth political participation. The data was further disaggregated according the male and female responses. The statistics indicated that an overwhelming 644 respondents were not participating in any electoral contest for their 'disinterest.' Out of this number, 395 male and 249 female were recorded. The next most critical reason is lack of fund and godfather support. Lots of evidence are available across

Sokoto State and even elsewhere in Nigeria that godfathers have dominated the political space. Thus, whoever want to join any political contest must do so through their gates. For example, the dominant godfathers in Sokoto politics are: Senator Aliyu Magatakardan Wamakko (former Deputy Governor and Governor), Alhaji Dalhatu Bafarawa (Former Governor), Aminu Waziri Tambuwa (Former Speaker, House of Representatives, and current Governor) (see briefs on selected godfathers).

BRIEFS ON SELECTED GODFATHERS IN SOKOTO

ALHAJI ATTAHIRU DALHATU BAFARAWA

ALHAJI ATTAHIRU BAFARAWA was born on 4th November 1954. He was the Executive Governor of Sokoto State from 29th May 1999 to 29th May 2007. He was a Local Government Councilor in charge of Education. In 1979, he ran unsuccessfully for election to the House of Representatives on the platform of the Great Nigeria Peoples Party (GNPP). He was a member of the National Constitutional Conference of 1994–1995, during the military rule of Sani Abacha. He was a founding member of the United Nigeria Congress Party (UNCP – 1997) and the All People's Party (APP – 1998). In 1999 he was elected governor of Sokoto State on the platform of the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP), and was re-elected for the ANPP in 2003. Attahiru Bafarawa founded the Democratic People's Party (DPP) and became its presidential candidate at the 2007 presidential elections.

ALHAJI ALIYU MAGATAKARDA WAMAKKO

Aliyu Wamakko of Sokoto State was born on 1 March 1953 in Wamakko, Sokoto State. He spent five years (1968–1972) at the Sokoto Teachers' College. After graduation, he worked as a teacher from 1973–1977 before being admitted to the University of Pittsburgh in the United States. He graduated with a B.Sc. in August 1980. Returning to Nigeria, he taught at Sokoto Teachers College. Wamakko took a job as Principal Assistant Secretary of Zurmi Local Government Area (LGA), later being promoted to Acting Secretary. He worked at Kaura Namoda LGA, and was appointed Chairman of the Sokoto LGA from 1986–1987. He became General Manager, Hotel Management and Tourism Board, Sokoto. In March 1992, he was promoted to Director-General, Careers and Special Services, Governor's Office, Sokoto in March 1992. He was elected Deputy Governor of Sokoto State to Governor Attahiru

Bafarawa in 1999, on the platform of the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP). He was re-elected Deputy Governor for a second term in April 2003. He resigned as Deputy Governor of Sokoto State on 15 March 2006. Wamakko ran successfully for Governor of Sokoto State in April 2007 on the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) platform, and assumed office on 29 May 2007. Following an appeal, his election was annulled in April 2008 on the basis that he had still been a member of the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) when he won the PDP nomination. Abdullahi Balarabe Salame was appointed Acting Governor (11 April - 28 May 2008) while a re-run was arranged. It was said that the contest was not so much between Wamakko and Muhammadu Maigari Dingyadi of the DPP, as between Wamakko and his predecessor Attahiru Bafarawa, founder of DPP. Wamakko regained his seat in the May 2008 re-run. His opponent claimed that the election was rigged and said he would appeal to the courts. In 2007, Wamakko launched the State Poverty Reduction Agency (SPORA) to run programs such as the youth skills acquisition program. In October 2009, the Sokoto State Commissioner of Justice said that the state was about to prosecute Wamakko's predecessor Attahiru Bafarawa and five others for alleged misappropriation of N2.919 billion. Bafarawa said the Sokoto commission of inquiry had been set up by Wamakko solely in order to discredit him. He said that Wamakko was his deputy whom the House nearly removed for corrupt tendencies, and that "If there were such illegal deductions and withdrawals, he should be in a better position to answer for them. Bafarawa asked the commission to invite Wamakko to testify so that certain issues could be clarified, but his request was refused on the ground that to do so was beyond the commission's mandate.

ALHAJI UMMARU KWABO AA

Ummarun Kwabo is a Nigerian politician, philanthropist and a business man. And

chairman of STCC Group of companies with more than 10 companies venture into Building, transportation, oil and Gas, Real Estate, pharmaceutical, construction and General contractors. He was born on 10th March 1954. He was an ally to Bafarawa who was the governor of Sokoto State between 1999 and 2007 and continued to be among the movers and shakers of Sokoto politics since then. He recently decamped from the ruling party PDP to opposition, APC.

The next key problem is violence. This factor has continued to manifest as impudent to youth political participation in the state. It is obvious that political activities in Sokoto State are always characterised by intense rivalry and violence between various political camps. Thus, political thugs are deployed in all party activities for protection, intimidation and electoral malpractice.

4.3.13 Level of Youth Political Participation

Overall, there is need to measure the broader level of youth political participation. This is to enable participate appreciate their level of political engagement and participation in the state. Figures 4.18 and 4.19 provide clear empirical evidence.

Figure 4.18: Youth Level of Political Participation in Sokoto





Figure 4.18 indicates that 37.33% of respondents believed that youth political participation in Sokoto is higher, 22.43% claimed participation to be very higher. And, 24.34% and 15.91% claimed that youth political participation was low and very low, respectively. This is a very good evidence and supported earlier empirical testimonies—that youth participate strong in all aspects of political activities in Sokoto, except being candidates for electoral contest, which was very low. Figure 4.19 further disaggregates the data according to Senatorial Zones. Thus, even across the zones, evidence suggests high youth political participation. The only exception to the norm is Sokoto South Senatorial Zone, which recorded 258 low measures as against 110 respondents with very high participation. Again, the high youth political participation stumbles at the gate of godfathers and lack of funding for electoral contest. This is holding the jugular vein of participation by youth for improve representation and governance.


Figure 4.19: Level of Youth Participation Across Senatorial Zones



4.3.14 Barrier to youth Political Participation in Sokoto

In various empirical analysis, impediments to specific areas of youth political participation were identified, for example, against voter registration, participation in party activities, membership of political parties, contesting elections and so on. However, in broader terms and cumulatively too, respondents' views were sought regarding the broader barriers to youth political participation in Sokoto State. In this way, Figure 4.20 presents empirical data of the survey.

Figure 4.20: Barrier to Youth political Participation




Broadly speaking, based on the empirical data in Figure 4.20, lack of funding is the main problem affecting youth political participation. Youth face daunting problem of unemployment and lack of reliable income generating activities. This, coupled with monetisation of Nigeria's political space, makes it too difficult for the youth to participate adequately in all political activities. The third most acute problem is lack of interest with 769 entries, lack of godfather support 685, high cost of politics 582 and cultural/religious reason with 339 entries. All the entries are high and therefore, all the factors are too critical to obstruct youth political participation in Sokoto. This evidence further corroborates all theoretical and empirical testimonies regarding factors affecting youth political participation in

the state. These barriers are stumbling stones.

4.3.15 Factors Affecting Youth Political Participation

It is important to note that barriers through related to factors, but the study views them to be different from affecting factors. Affecting factors erode interest and motivation to participate, while barriers don't even allow the interest and motivation to manifest. In this regard, a combination of barriers and affecting factors destroy the agency of youth as important pillars of democratisation and democratic governance in Nigeria. Figure 4.21 presents respondents' views regarding factors affecting youth political participation in Sokoto State.

Figure 4.21: Factors affecting Youth Political Participation



There is no contradiction. The data indicates that the factors affecting youth political participation overlapped with all other barriers to make the prospect of youth political participation, especially at substantive levels of electoral contest and governance too discouraging. For example, education, which is very low in Sokoto has 31% effect. Finance has 28%, godfatherism 19%, dominant political

influence of the godfathers 12% and lack of interest 10%. More importantly,

[...] the problem of godfathers is hinders youth participation in politics because the rate of unemployment and poverty is deliberately imposed on people for them to always become dependent on those elite. Youth lack quality education, good or portable drinking water, light and some

other basic necessities of life. It is only when people especially youth have good and quality education they will understand that they have a role to play for the development of political activities at various levels of their various communities (Idris Buhari, FGD, 2022)

in, [and] the youth doesn't have money to participate is an election to challenge those godfathers (Bashir Yusuf, FGD, 2022).

This picture is one of an agonising divide and discouraging prospects and calls for urgent policy reforms to ease the political tension and participation conundrum.


In all cases, these factors strongly affect youth political participation. When all these factors are crossed against all other barriers and political activities and process, a clear unambiguous picture is well painted regarding the pattern and nature of youth political participation in Sokoto. Similarly, a respondent notes that:

The politics of godfather is the cause of all the problems we have in our various communities. The reason for saying this is that the perception and believe of an ordinary citizen is that it is only the political elites, traditional rulers, rich men and educated elite that can be elected or appointed to a particular position. This is the reason why when you paste a poster of a politician the first question the common man will ask you is who is the father of this politician for him to know his status (sic). Also on the Election Day the first thing that will come to the mind of the common man is who will give him the highest amount of money among the candidates. This is where politics of money or money politics comes

4.3.16: Women Political Participation


Women are important pillars to democratic process. Beyond the question of their numbers, women have certain socio-cultural and biological peculiarities that make their inclusion in governance indispensable. Over the years, Nigeria has been very notorious in women political marginalisation. Statistics in this regard has been too gloomy. Though since 1999 progress has been made at national levels in terms of women appointment into substantive post, such as ministers, heads of agencies and departments. However, in terms of contesting and winning election, the road is still too thorny. The historical and socio-cultural character of Sokoto State as the "seat of the Caliphate" suggests, perhaps, expectedly that women would be politically marginalised. Evidence had confirmed this fear. Women participation is relegated to the basic exercise of their civic duties of voting and supporting. Figure 4.22 provides empirical statistics.

Figure 4.22: Women Participation in Political Activities in Sokoto



With affirmative yes 54% as against no 46%, it is clear that women do participate in political activities in Sokoto State. But to buttress the claim of marginalisation and relegation of women to the basic tenets of voting and support, Figure 4.23 from further explain for analytical synthesis.

Figure 4.23: Women Political Activities in Sokoto




Categorically, 755 response entries suggested that women participate only in party campaign activities. This well attested especially through door-to-door, which is always the domain of women. They also participate in party congresses and conventions 478 entries, especially as support groups from candidates and as decorators of political venues. Similarly, women also participate in party membership mobilisation with the 520 entries. These are the major activities partake by women in politics in Sokoto. Others include party fund raising. In fact, in the political history of Sokoto there has never been any woman that ever-

contested election, let alone win even at local government area level. This destination is still too far for women to reach. Various factors are responsible for this predicament.

4.3.17 Reasons for the Marginal Participation of Women in Politics


Though the question as to why women do not adequately participate in political activities has been answered by many theoretical studies, however, this research adopts empirical test with wider common views. Figure 4.24 provides statistical measurement of different factors.

Figure 4.24: Reasons for Women's Marginal Political Participation



The data shows that 33.7% of the respondents believed that cultural/religious factor is the main reason. This is not surprising for Sokoto people. When this is crossed against the religious affiliation of people in Figure 4.3, it would be convincing that religion is a major impediment to women political participation. The second most critical reason is lack of family support with 29.5%. When this is added to religion, then it is obvious that that 63.2% of respondents strongly believe that socio-cultural and religious factor is the main hiccup against women political participation in Sokoto. Other factors are lack of funds and violence. These are factors severing the already deplorable situation of women political participation in the state. This is needless to even ask if women actually participate in any electoral contest. For expediency, the study seeks to appreciate this question. Figure 4.25 provide statistical responses in this regard.

Figure 4.25: Women Participating in Political Contest in Sokoto




The data indicated that majority of 93% stress that women have never participated in any electoral contest in Sokoto. This is against 7% who agued that some women have participated. Balkisu Ibrahim in an FGD laments that:

Everyone has his own perception about youth participation in politics. My own view is that, women especially youth has not been given any chance to participate in political activities to be elected or appointed into key positions even though we have a lot of educated people among us but our male counterparts especially elite in our various communities are not willing or ready to support us to participate actively in politics. Even at the local level we are not given

any opportunity to participate beyond casting vote and campaign because when there is an election majority of people that came out to vote are women, yet, our participation in politics is only limited to campaign, voting and other party activities not to be elected or appointed into political positions (sic) (Balkisu Ibrahim, FGD, 2022).

Overall, this supports earlier argument regarding the perception of women in political participation. The same reasons were advanced regarding factors affecting women political engagement in political contest. Figure 4.26 provides empirical evidence.

Figure 4.26: Reasons for Women Not Participating in Electoral Contest



The key reasons are religion/culture, lack of fund and violence. Thus, in the context of youth political participation all factors either against and/or in favour have overlapped and crossed each other. The impediments are real and not imagined, as they are based on empirical evidence. In addition to this, respondents were also asked to rate level of women political participation in the state. Table 4.8 presents data on the level of women participation in political activities.

Table 4.8: Level of Women Participation in Politics


Rate	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative
High	29	1.26	1.26
Very high	542	23.47	24.73
Low	1,170	50.67	75.4
Very low	568	24.6	100
Total	2,309	100	

The Table shows that of the total 2,309 response entries, 75% believed that women political participation is low. Only 24.73 believed that it was very high. The reasons advanced earlier also suffice for factors responsible for low women political participation in Sokoto State. These reasons are religious, socio-cultural, lack of fund, violence and so on.

4.3.18 The Role of Social Media in Youth Political Participation

The role of social media in easing and facilitating youth political participation is well documented. Today, social media is the new instrument of deepening democratisation and democratic governance. On this perspective, the study seeks to examine respondents' views regarding the role of social media in youth political participation. Figure 4.27 shows respondents' opinion regarding the question "do you use social media?"

Figure 4.27: Youth's Use of Social Media




The data indicated that majority of 82% respondents use social media. Regardless of whatever reason youth employ social media, the fact it is being used suggests that invariably it could serve as an instrument of political mobilisation, information, orientation and participation. The statistics is very impressive. A respondent in FGD eloquently states inter alia that:

Social media is playing a vital role in enhancing youth participation in politics because presently, you will hardly find a youth that is not conversant with the use of social network, almost all the political parties have their social media agent that inform people about the activities of their political party. Moreover, the role of social media to political parties is beyond mere campaign activities. It has reached to the extent that social media is been used to inform people about the achievement and successes of a politician or a political party which sometime influence the interest of other people to elect or participate in the

activities of that political party (sic). However, there a lot of challenges associated with the use of social media. This is because a lot of those people especially the youth who purchase their phones and buy data with their own money do say whatever they want on the social media without thinking about the consequences of their action. Also, with regard to the issue of informing people about the use and importance of voter's card, party membership registration, etc. Youth through social media are playing a vital role in informing people to get voters card and party membership registration and to understand that the importance of voter's card is beyond casting vote (sic) (Naziru Ibrahim, FGD, 2022).

It shows youth awareness of social media and that it is easily accessible regardless of individual's level of income. To further corroborate the types of social media being used, Figure 4.28 provides data in this regard.

Figure 4.28: Types of Social Media used by Respondents



Accordingly, the data in Figure 4.28 indicated that 36%, 37% and 13% of the respondents used WhatsApp, Facebook and Instagram, respectively. While only 7% each used Telegram and Twitter. This shows greater awareness and utilisation of the major world social media platforms and handles. It is rather saying the obvious that with social media the youth could certainly be able to participate and engage politically. It is perhaps in view of this that major political parties and candidates, not only create social media handles; they also employ political advisors on strategic social media activities. To further buttress this point more clearly, Figure 4.29 and Table 4.9 provide data regarding reason for respondents' use of social media.

Figure 4.29: Reasons for the use of Social Media (%)




Table 4.9: Reasons for the Use of Social media


Element	Communicate with Family	Entertainment	Political Activity	Business activity	Enlightenment
Strongly Agree	71.93	45.71	29.4	7.52	13.42
Agree	25.06	42.93	37.34	47.59	38.36
Undecided	0.95	6.14	9.71	29.96	42.7
Strongly disagree	0.3	2.18	8.62	6.68	3.15
Disagree	1.75	3.04	14.94	8.24	2.38

The data on the reasons for the use of social media demonstrably show that variously and differently, youth use social media to 'communicate with family members' (71.93% strongly agreed), for 'entertainment' (45.71% strongly agreed) and only 29.4% strongly agreed that social media was used for political activities. Cumulatively, 97.3% agreed that social media is used to communicate with family members, 88.64% agreed about social media's use for entertainment, 66.74% agreed its use for political activities, 55.11% agreed for business, and 51.78% agreed that social media is use for enlightenment. Generally, this suggests that youth employ social media as a means of political participation. This is even when over 90% uses it for family matters. Even in family affairs, people talk about politics and use social media as a veritable political instrument. However, other use of social media is as instrument of violence and fake news: A respondent argues that:

The social media has helped greatly in improving the standard of a political party. For example, a politician can do something that will tarnish his image in the society; a social media agent of his opponent from another political party will make use of that incidence to tarnish the image of that politician which may be a reason for reducing his supporters because of what he has done. Not only that, another negative effect of social media has to do with triggering violence through the use of foul language that can create problems between and among different political parties and politicians (Aliyu KII, 2022).

To further understand the role of social media in political participation, respondents were asked about different ways in which social media is used in politics. Figure 4.30 provide statistical data in this regard.


Figure 4.30: Ways through which Social Media enhances Youth Politics (%)



From this figure, 45% of respondents argued that social media is used for party campaigns; while 38% believed that it is used for membership mobilisation. By implication, political parties as the central pillars of democratic activities instrumentalise the use of social media to enhance their activities vis-à-vis enable youth to also partake politically. As stated earlier, political parties and individual party candidates connect easily with their supporters through social media.

In Sokoto political gossips are spread easily through social media. Campaign jingles and political songs are everywhere being played through the use of social media. In fact, it is not an exaggeration to stress that social media is adequately competing with the traditional media. For the youth, social media is even handier. Thus, Figure 4.31 presents respondents' views on the importance of social media over traditional media and the vice versa.

Figure 4.31: Respondents views on Media with More Influence




Clearly and obviously too, 75% of respondents believed that social media has more political and social influence than the traditional media of radio, television and newspapers. A respondent at FGD session opines that:

No one will argue the fact that social media is one of the most important sources of information especially among the youth. For instance, you will hardly see a youth using traditional media, they are now much exposed and conversant in using the new media stations like social network. However, youth participation in politics is only limited to casting of vote, campaign, mobilization of supporters for a political party etc. For example,

all the political parties at different levels have concluded their primary elections but among all the forty (40) candidates we have across the political parties, only one candidate we have as a youth (sic) (Idris Buhari, FGD, 2022).

For this reason, it is expedient upon all relevant political stakeholders to continue to exploit the use of social media to strengthen their activities vis-à-vis improve youth political participation. Accordingly, and as elaborated earlier, respondents were also asked about the effect of social on political participation. Figure 4.32 presents statistical evidence in this regard.

Figure 4.31: Effect of Social Media on Respondents' Political Participation



The data showed that majority of respondents were highly affected by social media. Similarly, second category of respondents was moderately affected, and only about 15% of respondents were not affected, accordingly. Cumulatively, this indicates an overwhelming

effect of social media on youth political participation in Sokoto State. Against this finding, respondents were also asked to rate the effectiveness of social media as instrument of youth political participation. In this regard, Table 4.10 provides clear evidence.


Table 4.10: Rating the Effectiveness of Social Media in Youth Political Participation

Rating Element	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Very effective	1,114	48.84
Moderately effective	692	30.34
Less effective	311	13.63
Not effective	164	7.19
Total	2,281	100%

Accordingly, the table indicates that 48.84% of respondents stressed that social media is very effective in youth political participation, and 30.43% moderately agreed to this assertion. Cumulatively, 79.18% rated the effectiveness of social media for youth participation in politics to be effective. This is very encouraging and suggests that stakeholders must continue to

explore various ways to enhance the use of social media youth political participation. And, finally effectiveness of the use of social media would depend on its strength, as use would be somewhat addicted to it. Thus, Figure 4.33 provides evidence on the strength of social media in youth political participation in Sokoto State.

Figure 4.33: Strength of Social Media in Youth Political Participation




The social media is a veritable instrument of youth political participation. Majority of respondents with 973 entries rate the strength of the social media high, while 919 entries rated it very high. Cumulatively, 1,892 responses rated the strength of the social media in your political participation high. This is against only 406 responses that rated it low. The prospect of strengthening youth political participation in Sokoto lies with the social media. This opportunity must be exploited even beyond mere participation to the issue of using it to improve governance through holding government to account, transparency, rule of law, freedom of information, and so on.

4.4. Trust, Institutions and Youth Political Participation

Despite the instrumentalities of other variables of political participation, such as political parties and social media, trust is a veritable ingredient that stimulates political participation. The idea of trust as enhancer of confidence in institution is well documented in theoretical and empirical literature. It is in this context that this study examines the question of trust, institution and youth political participation. Figure 4.34 presents data for the question of “how much do you trust political parties as mechanism for youth political participation?”


Figure 4.34: Trust in Political Parties by LGAs



The statistics demonstrated that across all the LGAs in the three Senatorial zones, trust in political parties, as mechanism for youth political participation has been moderate and low. When trust wanes over time, individuals find it difficult to partake in party activities. For example, in Wamakko, Tambuwal, Dange/Shuni, and Gwadabawa, trust in parties was moderate. Cumulatively, lack of trust in parties,

means that youth would not be enthusiastic to engage in party activities, including registration and party congress and primaries. It also means that if trust was high, the data presented on youth participation in party activities would have been impressively excellent. Explaining the reasons for low and low and moderate trust in parties as mechanism of participation, Figure 4.35 presents empirical data of such reasons.

Figure 4.35: Reason for the Low Trust in Political Parties




Political parties in Nigeria critically lack principles of internal democracy in their structural operations. All party activities hardly comply with the internal rules and constitution of political parties. Little wonder, therefore, that party congresses and primaries often end in different court for various allegations of manipulations and non-adherence to the rule of political competition. Thus, in Figure 4.35 56% of respondents identified lack of internal party democracy as key impediment to low trust in political parties. And, 42% believed that it is the factor of parties' sharing elective position among their key godfathers, who control and finance the parties. Apart from party offices that are given to party stalwarts of godfathers, even elective offices, from Governorship position to LGA chairman, godfathers decide who becomes what, where and when. The popular definition of politics by Harold Lasswell, even if wrongly could apply here—who get what, when and how—the godfathers and other elites decide on these key political questions. Broadly speaking sharing of offices to elite is a fundamental aspect of lack of internal party democracy. Individuals are not allowed to partake in political competition, which is the central tenet of democracy. All other reasons, including not allowing everyone to participate

could be directly linked lack of internal party democracy. For example, FGD participants and KIIs attested that since 1999, the main godfather of Sokoto politics and who over the years dominated political parties are Alhaji Attahiru Dalhatu Bafarawa and Senator Aliyu Magatakardan Wamakko. Today, the former controls the PDP, while the later controls the APC. Furthermore, Nazir Umar laments that *"We trust the political parties 100% but they violated the trust and betrayed us, so we no longer have trust in them. They presented to us our current leaders and requested we trust them but they later violated the trust and betrayed us, so we will hold the party accountable for this"* (Nazir Umar, FGD, 2022).


The second most important institution of democracy is the electoral umpire that conducts periodic elections. Elections provide that formidable opportunity for youth to express their preferences and choose party candidates to form government and to represent their communities. Figure 4.36 presents data on level of trust in INEC as institution statutorily responsible for conducting election in Nigeria. it must be emphasised that INEC has been conducting general elections in the country since 1999.

Figure 4.36: Level of Trust in INEC



In terms of trust, INEC was rated low, with 1,680 responses. In fact, in all the LGAs under review, INEC was rated low. This eroded the confidence of youth to even contest elections. This poor rating of trust in INEC is not unconnected with series of bad elections that the umpire conducted over the years, with 2007 and 2011 being the worse elections ever conducted in the history of Nigeria. Regarding the reasons for the low trust in INEC, Figure 4.37 provides respondents views in this regard.

Figure 4.37: Reason for Low Level of Trust in INEC




The statistical data revealed that majority of respondents of 47% believed that election rigging was the main reason for low level of trust in INEC, 34% argued for incompetent election management and 18% identified cumbersome election procedures. The elections of 2007 and 2011 as the most poorly conducted elections could explain the reason for low level of trust against INEC. However, today there is significant improvement in INEC conduct of elections. But much needs to be done to improve its image and trust by citizenry in order to strengthen

youth political participation.

Equally important is the measurement the citizens' trust on their governments. Government is the major pillar of every aspect of governance, administration and public policy. When government enjoys high level of trust, it correspondingly enjoys legitimacy and popularity. And such trust would enhance youth political participation in government activities. Figure 4.38 presents data on respondents' opinion on trust in Government.


Figure 4.38: Level of Trust in Sokoto State Government by Senatorial Zone



Once again, the statistical data suggested that across Sokoto State trust in Government among the people, particularly the youth was low. For example, a total of 1,106 responses rated trust in Government low, 679 rated it moderate and 496 rated it high. Cumulatively and on average majority of youth and perhaps even overall citizens of Sokoto State do not really trust their Government. This could erode confidence of the people in addressing their socio-economic

problems and challenges, thereby becoming droopiness towards political issues and activities. For the youth, this could be a reason for non-political participation and apathy. As the case has been—low trust in Government—the study probes reasons for such views. Figure 4.39 presents data on reasons for low trust in Government as an influencer of youth political participation.

Figure 4.39: Reasons for Low Level of Trust in Government




Nigeria is rated as a corrupt country, with the presence of all indices of corruption are everywhere. Various studies have attested empirically and theoretically the deepening troubling corruption in Nigeria. Annual reports from International Organisations, such as the Transparency International, the Mo Ibrahim Governance report, UNDP, World Bank, and so, all attest periodically the deepening level of corruption in Nigeria. In fact, these studies had variously blamed Nigeria's high level of corruption as hugely responsible for all its socio-economic and security predicaments. Corruption has really permeated all nooks and corners of Nigeria. It is, therefore, obvious that majority of respondents, 43% in this survey believed that corruption was one of main reason for low level of citizens' trust in Government. Government not addressing the people's problem, 24% was the second most important reason for low trust in Government. Then nepotism, defined in terms of Government discriminating against its citizens in terms of provisions of social amenity and employment, with 18% is the third reason for low level of trust against Government. The fourth reason was high level of insecurity with a

score of 15%. Overall, these are critical reasons and ordered in their critical effects on citizenry social life as the defining elements of distrust. The consequence of this picture against youth political participation is lethargic. However, despite this low level of trust in Government, Sokoto State periodically record high level of voter turnout, even among the youth during general elections. One would have expected people's demonstration of their distrust to stay away from polling units during general election. Other factors could be responsible for the increasing voter turnout in Sokoto. One of such reasons was monetisation of the political space, in which for example, vote buying becomes a common feature of all the previous elections in the state.

Based on this conundrum, the survey seeks to project respondents' opinion in terms of a conditional prospect of whether improving the functional performance of the political institutions—political parties, INEC and Government— would that increase their level of confidence and trust to politically engage and participate. Figure 4.40 presents survey result in this respect.

Figure 4.40: Possibility of increasing confidence in Political Institutions




Indeed, the function of any Government is to meet up with the citizens' demands and address their challenges. When Government functionally performs, all things being equal, trust of its citizens is therefore given. Conditionally, majority of respondents opined that if Government, Political parties and INEC and perhaps other public institutions improve their functional performance, their trust in them would increase, thereby increasing their level of political participation. For example, 61.1% of respondents agreed that institutions' good performance would increase their level of trust in them. When this is disaggregated against the three Senatorial Zones, Sokoto Central has 62.5%, Sokoto South 61.3 and Sokoto East 59.5%. This is very good statistics, which should encourage all these institutions to continue to improve their functional performance as conditions for increasing level of citizens' trust vis-à-vis youth political participation in their activities.

4.5. Godfathers as Dominant Political Actors and Youth Political Participation

In previous analysis of empirical survey data, the study demonstrated the importance of godfathers in political activities and governance in Sokoto State. In fact, godfathers as dominant political actors are so important that they decide what happen in political parties and other institutions of government. At this juncture, the study singles out these dominant political figures to examine their broader role in youth political participation. Because of the social intricacies of Sokoto State in terms of political, religious and social relationships and interactions, respondents were asked to identify the dominant political actors in the state. Figure 4.41 presents results of the survey.

Figure 4.41: Godfathers and Dominant Political Actors in Sokoto



The result shows that 41% of godfathers and dominant political actors are politicians. This is where prominent names could be mentioned, such as Senator Aliyu Magatakardan Wamakko, Alhaji Attahiru Dalhatu Bafarawa, RT Honourable Aminu Waziri Tambuwal, Senator Ila Gada, Senator Jibrin Gada (former Minister), Alhaji Umarun Kwabo AA, Alhaji Maigwandu, Senator Ibrahim Danbaba Dambuwa, Alhaji Dahiru Tambuwal, Alhaji Abubakar Shehu Tambuwal, Senator Gobir and so on. Educational elites, with 30% responses were believed to be godfathers and dominant political actors. These are people perceived to be working with politicians and government and hold political appointments at state and national levels. Mentioned could also be made of Prof Aisha Madawaki, Prof Maitafsir, Prof Bashi Garba (former Secretary to the Government), Prof MLA Bashar, Alhaji Maigona, etc. traditional rulers as dominant political actors had score of 14%. This group of people work behind the scenes to influence government activities. Examples include the Sultan of Sokoto, Alhaji Muhammad Saad Abubakar III, Sarkin Binji, Sarkin Yakin Gagi, etc. Religious leaders by their moral influence also are regarded as dominant political actors with only 15% responses. Example of these in Sokoto include, Sheik Gidan Kanawa, Sheik Bello Yabo, Sheik Jibrin, Sheik Sidi Attahiru, Prof (Sheik) Mansur Ibrahim, etc. It is just stating the obvious that all these individuals influence political processes in Sokoto State. Idris Buhari, for example argues that:


The way godfathers' influence can be stopped or reduced is to established a law by the government like the way it is for civil servants about the age of those who will be aspiring for a elective and appointed positions. ... This will definitely give youth a chance and opportunities to participate actively in politics. For example, law should be established which should stipulate that

whoever serve as two terms as a Senator, member of House of Representatives, State House of Assembly or Chairman of LGA should step aside and allow others to come up. Let me give you an example of Alhaji Magatakarda Wamako, he has been Deputy Governor, he became a Governor and served for two terms. After that he became a Senator since 2015 and he is contesting for Senate again and he is not the only person from his Senatorial District. Why can't he allow others to contest? But because he is part of the godfathers of Sokoto state politics he has been doing all what he feels like. The most important thing that can be done to reduce godfathersm in politics is by establishing a law that will work on the age of those to be elected and appointed at various positions. This will greatly help in bringing youth to participate actively in politics (Idris Buhari, KII, 2022).

Of course, godfathers are threat to youth political participation. I told you earlier that I wanted to contest but was told to wait for my turn. The youth are lacking resources, which they can use to buy form and sponsor their campaign activities. If you are not in good terms with any of the godfathers, you cannot make it in politics. However, though the godfathers have now started supporting youth, those are their own sons and daughters. Attahiru Bafarawa supported his sons and he successfully secured the ticket to contest for the office of the deputy governor (sic) (Umar Aminu, KII, 2022).


By their political pedigree, they could influence significantly youth political participation. As to why these individuals are regarded as godfathers and dominant political actors, Figure 4.42 presents the survey result.

Figure 4.42: Reasons for the Dominance of Political Actors



The most fundamental reasons for the dominance of political space by these individuals are high level of their educational achievement (31.7%), wealth (31.4%) and political influence 36.9%. Of these reason, political influence is the most important. In democratic process, one must command political respect to be able mobilised and influence the political processes. These individuals are knowledgeable and have enormous amount of wealth to spend in political activities. Similarly, directly link to the reasons above, is the question of why respondents consider them as dominant political actors. Figure 4.43, therefore, presents the survey result.


Figure 4.43: Why they are considered as Dominant Political Actors



The data only corroborate the survey results of Figure 4.42 in that these individuals were considered as godfathers and dominant political actors because of their positions as "political gatekeepers" (31.2%), providing huge financial support (35.4%) and mass political support (32.6%). In all these cases, godfathers make enormous contribution to the overall political processes and governance in Sokoto. This explains why they influence who get what and how, to use the famous title of Harold Lasswell's book. They hold the jugular of the political process and often including governmental activities. Examples


are common about the enormous power of godfathers in Nigerian politics. The famous stories of Andy Uba in Anambra during the governorship of Senator Chris Ngige, in which the Governor was kidnapped and the case of Chief Lamidi Adedibu, the popular Ibadan godfather, with his Amala politics; and the late Shola Saraki in Kawara politics. The role of godfathers and other dominant political actors in youth political participation cannot be under rated. Thus, Figure 4.44 presents survey result regarding the opinion of respondents in this regard.

Figure 4.44: Roles of Godfather as Barriers to Youth Political Participation



No one can doubt the role of dominant political actors in youth political participation. Perhaps, this is why majority of respondents believed that the role godfathers play in political process is not a barrier (78%) to youth political participation. However, still 22% respondents stress that godfathers are impediments to youth political participations. For those who believed that godfathers' role is inimical to youth political participation, Figure 4.45 presents survey results of their reasons.

Figure 4.45: Barriers created by Dominant Political Actors against Youth Participation



Accordingly, in various ways, godfathers and dominant political actors, despite their enormous role to political processes and government are considered to youth political participation. Majority of respondents 23.8% argued that dominant political actors often “deny access to others” outside their cycles, particularly the youth, while 22.9% of respondents stressed that godfathers were barriers to youth political participation because they “control elected political office holders.” There is clear evidence of this scenario everywhere in Nigeria, let alone Sokoto State. The case of Senator Aliyu Magatakardan Wamakko, Alhaji Dalhatu Bafarawa, etch are primes examples. The next in the order of barrier is godfathers “control political parties” with 16.9% opinion. Godfathers finance the activities of political parties, and this gives them control of their parties. In various scenarios, the National Headquarters of various political parties handover state chapters to these prominent individuals. For example, in Sokoto State Aliyu Magatakardan Wamakko is the father of the APC. He determines everything about APC (Aminu, KII, 2022). Other ways through dominant political actors form barriers to youth political participation in Sokoto include, undermining others outside their political cycles 15.2%, organising and perpetrating election malpractice 10.6%, and organising election violence 10.6%.

In this regard, a respondent argues that:

These dominant political actors are the cause for undermining youths simply because they are ones releasing money to political parties, this makes party not

to admire youth political contest. These political gladiators usually buy form at exorbitant price and still issue gift in millions to the chairman of the party, how do you expect the chairman of a party to support a youth that does not have 10 million Naira, it is these politicians that usually undermine youths (Interview, Aliyu, 2022)

In all these cases, dominant political actors undermine youth political participation to the extent of relegating aspiring individuals to the background. Naziru Ibrahim notes that:

The problem associated with youth participation in politics is being associated with godfatherism because even if you have the money as a youth those elite will not allow you to cross the line of becoming a party candidate for an election. Even that person who was the only youth among the 40 candidates was only able to clinch the ticket as a result of the godfather support, he enjoys. He is the only one at the age of 39-40 years who happens to contest for the seat of House of Representative at Sokoto East and this is the first time in our political history (Naziru Ibrahim, FGD, 2022).

Through these barriers, godfathers control the fate and phase of the political processes of Sokoto. This would continue unabated. Change would only come if the barriers are broken and gates are widely open for everyone. However, the possibilities and prospect of this happening is brightly gloomy. The holes and caves are too dark!

PART V



KEY FINDINGS, POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION



5. 1. Key Findings

Based on the presentation and analysis of empirical data, the key findings of this study are:

1. Political parties as the important pillars of political activities are the platforms for youth political participation in Sokoto State. Majority of youth in the state identify with political parties as registered members and supporters and in participating in party activities such as party primaries, congresses, and membership mobilisation and election campaigns. However, despite their overwhelming support to political parties, the youth could not participate as party candidates during elections. This limits the role of parties in driving youth political participation in Sokoto. Other factors that limit participation in party activities include, political violence, lack of internal party democracy, high cost of party activities, etc.
2. Education qualification and age are important determinants of youth political participation. As violence, disinterest and other reasons obstruct political participation, the study finds that the larger percentage of those who did not participate because of these factors is having tertiary education. This suggests that the higher the level of education, the higher the probability of individuals taking independent rational decision to avoid danger. Similarly, in terms of age, the study finds that the percentage of those not participating in political activities due to violence and other factors are in the age bracket of 17-30 years.
3. Beyond the question of money, majority of youth in Sokoto State participate in political activities for rational reasons of supporting their parties, personal security, as registered members of their parties and support their friends/parents. This shows that the youth in the state prioritise political self-interest and self-conscientiousness. Thus, they can avoid

being used as political thugs and agents of political violence.

4. Overwhelming majority of youth in Sokoto are not only registered members of their various political parties, but also registered and obtained their voter's card (PVC) (72%) and voted in recent elections (90%).
5. In Sokoto state youth participate in various political activities. Despite this encouraging finding, however, over 72% of the youth have never contested any election for the very reasons of high cost of politics, dominance of godfathers, religious and cultural reasons and lack of godfather support.
6. Women participation in politics in Sokoto is limited to the basics of voting, campaigns, party congresses and primaries by the factors of religion and culture, lack of family support, political violence and lack of money.
7. Majority of the youth in Sokoto use all the categories of social media (82%)—Twitter, Telegram, Instagram, Facebook, WhatsApp, etc.—for various reasons including entertainment, enlightenment, communicating with family members, business, political activities, etc. This offers great prospect improving youth political participation.
8. There is an apparent low trust in political institutions among the youth. Across the state, INEC, political parties and Government as pillars of political participation are not trusted by the youth. The main reasons for low trust in political parties include, lack of internal democracy, dominance of godfathers and other political elites. While for INEC the reasons for low trust are poor conduct of elections, election rigging and cumbersome election procedures. And, for Government, the reasons low trust include corruption, nepotism, high level of insecurity and not addressing people's needs and aspirations.
9. Godfathers, as dominant political actors, control Sokoto politics and governance at

the detriment of youth political participation. The reasons for their dominance are high level of education, financial and political influence. They are dominant because they are gatekeepers of political space and political ecosystem of Sokoto and provide huge financial support to party and Government activities. Based on their gatekeeping activities, such as organising and perpetuating political violence, controlling political party machineries, controlling elected and appointed officer holders, deny other people outside their cycles access to politics and undermining politically aspiring individuals, godfathers obliterate youth political participation.

5.2 Policy Recommendations

These conflicting key findings offer both despair and hope. However, the prospect for strengthening youth political participation is high. The despair could turn to hope, but the journey is not promisingly easy. The following key policy recommendations could offer such hope and consolidate the prospects.

1. As political parties are the fundamental pillars of political participation and democratic governance, and part of their activities inimical to youth political participations, it is recommended that parties' activities should be professionally regulated. Constitutionally INEC is responsible for such regulatory functions. Such functions should be strengthened accordingly.
2. There should extensive advocacy by CSO and other key stakeholders to sensitise the youth to embrace tertiary education as it opens fundamentals political opportunities, including participation in party activities and governance. Through this, enrolment and retention of students in tertiary institutions would be improved. Youth of 17-30 years generally tend to be more rational in their thinking and decisions. And this is the age of tertiary education. Once enrolment and retention of students (youth) at tertiary institution is improved, it will translate into better and more productive youth political participation in Sokoto. When youth are empowered educationally, they will be rational and self-conscientious in their political activities.
3. The social media offers great opportunity for strengthening youth political participation. This is because in Sokoto majority of youth use social media for various reasons. Thus, the youth's use of social media should be professionally managed to enable them to participate politically and employ social media handles for political reasons rather than mere entertainment. Political parties and Government should establish professional Social Media Offices to handle such matters. Adequate training should be given to the officers, including training of youth in different capacities to use social media politically professionally. Through this the negative effects of social media as instrument of fake news, violence and conflict could be minimised.
4. Political parties, INEC and Government should continue to improve their functional performance in order to increase the confidence and trust of youth in their activities. This could be done through reforms for professional performance. Youth should be involved directly in the act of governance in order to represent their peers and directly address their challenges.
5. Due largely to the nature of political violence affecting political participation, it is recommended that security agencies managing political activities should be adequately trained. This will enhance their professional conduct and nib in the bud any potentials for violence. Similarly,

adequate security should always be provided during the conduct of any political activity, such as campaigns, party primaries and congresses, and general elections.

6. Political party management and activities related to internal democracy should be reformed in such a way that excessive use of money, for example for the purchase of forms for party primaries, congresses is controlled. Similarly, political party constitutions should be reviewed in such a way that beyond the appointment of a Woman Leader and Youth Leader, certain key political offices in party structures and organs should be reserved for the youth. This will help to break the dominance of godfathers and ease the tension of control and gatekeeping of the political space.
7. In all these issues, socio-political context is an existential reality that defines historical and contemporary political contours and ecosystem of governance. Accordingly, political culture of Sokoto being predominantly parochial and traditional to a large extent explains the current scenario of youth political participation. In this context, it is important that primary focus in advocacy and sensitisation be given to socio-political orientation on political participation. This would help to further liberalise the political space for youth participation, including women participation in key political activities. The advocacy should also be extended to political elites (godfathers) who strongly control the political space, often, outside the dictate of party constitutions..

5.3 Conclusion

This is an important study. Youth are the central coordinating group of any populations. Understanding their energies, challenges, problems and prospects of their development and productivity is sine-qua-non to building a humans and inclusive political society. Nigeria's democracy operates retrospectively and regressively because its critical people and perhaps the most populous of the population—the youth—are marginalised and relegated. However, today, there is clarion call everywhere for the inclusion of youth in the country's political affairs. This is because governance is everything. This study exposed the promises, potentials and challenges of youth political participations in Sokoto. The challenges are enormous, but the promises and potentials are enormous too. Youth in Sokoto are rationally enthusiastic, motivated and confidence. But these potentials are being thwarted and frustrated by the dominance of the godfathers and other dominant political actors, including violence and excessive monetisation of the political space. Though breaking the stronghold of godfathers on the political space and political parties seems to be somewhat herculean, however, steady reforms in the structures of political space and adequate regulation of the activities of political parties, which are the mechanisms of the whole democratic system and for youth political participation, could break that stronghold and ease the space for youth to also hold the keys to the gates of political activities. The critical reform is to strengthen INEC regulatory functions and to amend party constitutions to ease youth participation in all areas of party activities, including party primaries, congresses, membership, party finance, campaigns, etc.

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
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APPENDICES



APPENDIX I: RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE

Youth Political Participation in Sokoto: Breaking the Stronghold and Creating Pathways

Dear Respondent,

Youth political participation is critical to the stable democratic process and governance. Understanding its dynamics could help with the scientific characterization and classification of different polities as responsive and responsible administratively. Today, there is a broader, albeit, in ambiguous ways, a general resurgence in youth political activism in political parties, voting, social media political engagement, etc. But in new democracies, as is the case in Nigeria, this resurgence and awakening is reflected increasing voter registration and turnout in general elections by the youth. However, such participation still remains at the edge of political space. Many factors appear to have constrained what could have been a major breakthrough in Nigeria's march to democratic progress.

The broad aim of this research is, therefore, to investigate the extent to which on one hand the activities of political parties, electoral institutions and dominant political actors could explained the increasing youth voter registration and high voter turn out, and on the other hand their participation is mere symbolism in Sokoto State.

To help with the investigation, kindly complete this questionnaire and/or grant us your valuable time for interview. The information being provided will only be used for academic and policy purposes only. We assure you of confidentiality.

Thank you.

RESEARCH TEAM

SECTION A: Location Information

Instruction: Kindly fill as appropriate

Town/Community	
Local Government Area	
Senatorial Zone	

SECTION B: Socio-Economic Characteristics of Respondent

1. Name of Respondent (optional)

2. Sex of Respondent:

- a. Male ()
- b. Female ()

3. Age of Respondent:

- a. 17 – 30 ()
- b. 31 – 40 ()
- c. 41 – 50 ()
- d. 51 – 60 ()

4. Highest level of education:

- a. Qur'anic Education ()
- b. Primary School ()
- c. Secondary school ()
- d. Tertiary Education ()
- e. None ()

5. Occupation of the respondent:

- a. Farming ()
- b. Artisan ()
- c. Civil servant ()
- d. Student ()
- e. Business ()
- f. Other ()

6. Monthly income of the respondent

- a. Less than 10,000 Naira ()
- b. 10,001 –20, 000 Naira ()
- c. 20,001 – 30, 000 Naira ()
- d. Above 30, 000 Naira ()

7. Ethnicity of Respondent:

- a. Hausa ()
- b. Fulani ()
- c. Yoruba ()
- d. Igbo ()
- e. Others (specify).....

8. Religion of Respondent:

- a. Islam ()
- b. Christianity ()
- c. Others (specify).....

SECTION C: Role of Political Parties in Youth Political Participation

9. Which of the following political party do you support?

- a. APC ()
- b. PDP ()
- c. Others (specify)
- d. None ()

If none, skip Questions 10 and 11

10. Are you a registered member of a political party?

- a. Yes ()
- b. No ()

11. If yes in 10 above, which of the political party are you a member?

- a. APC ()
- b. PDP ()
- c. Others (specify)

12. If the answer is "No" to Question 10 above, why are you not a registered member? (Multi-choice)

- a. It is difficult to register ()
- b. Cannot afford to pay registration fee ()
- c. Not believing in the parties' values ()
- d. Don't like all the parties ()
- e. Fear of political violence ()

f. I am not allowed to register ()

g. Others (specify)

13. Which of the following political party activities have you recently participated? (Multi-choice)

a. Party campaign activities ()

b. Party congresses and conventions ()

c. Party meetings ()

d. Party fund raising activity ()

e. Membership mobilization and support ()

f. None ()

14. If the answer is None to 13 above, why?

a. Due to violence ()

b. Not interested in party activities ()

c. Not allowed to participate ()

d. Others (specify)

15. In what capacity did you participate in political party activities? (Multi-choice)

a. As a registered member of the party ()

b. Supporter of the party ()

c. Family member/parent being a member ()

d. To support friend/colleague ()

e. As a personal security ()

f. To get money ()

16. Do you have a voter's card?

a. Yes ()

b. No ()

17. If the answer is "Yes" to Question 16 above, did you vote in the recent general election?

a. Yes ()

b. No ()

18. If the answer is "No" to Question 16 above, why didn't you vote? (Multi-choice)

a. Not interested in the candidates ()

b. Violence associated with the election ()

- c. Not believing in the party ()
- d. Others (specify).....

19. Have you participated in any electoral contest (party, LGA or General elections)?

- a. Yes ()
- b. No ()

20. If the answer is "Yes" to Question 19 above, why did you participate? (Multi-choice)

- a. Godfather support ()
- b. To represent my people ()
- c. To get money ()
- d. To have access to power ()
- e. To bring change ()
- f. Others (specify)

21. If the answer is No to question 19 above, why didn't you participate?

- a. Religious and cultural reasons ()
- b. Lack of funder/godfather ()
- c. Violence ()
- d. Not interested ()
- e. Others (specify)

22. How will you rate the level of youth political participation in your community?

- a. High ()
- b. Very high ()
- c. Low ()
- d. Very low ()

23. What do you think is the barrier to active political participation by the youth? (multi-choice)

- a. Lack of finance ()
- b. Lack of interest ()
- c. Cultural/religious reasons ()
- d. Lack of support/godfather ()
- e. High cost of politics ()

24. Which of the following do you think is the most important factor affecting youth active political

participation? (Multi-choice)

- a. Education ()
- b. Finance ()
- c. Political Influence ()
- d. Interest ()
- e. Godfatherism ()

25. Do female youth in your community participate in politics?

- a. Yes ()
- b. No ()

26. If the answer is Yes to Question 25 above, in which of the following activities do female youth in your community participate? (Multi-choice)

- a. Party campaign activities ()
- b. Party congresses and conventions ()
- c. Party membership mobilization ()
- d. Party fund raising activity ()
- e. Others (specify)
- f. None ()

27. If the answer is No to Question 25 above, why are female youth not participating in politics in your community? (Multi-choice)

- a. Lack of funds ()
- b. Lack of family support ()
- c. Cultural/religious reasons ()
- d. Violence ()
- e. Others (specify)

28. Have female youth in your community participated in any electoral contest (Party, LGA or General elections)?

- a. Yes ()
- b. No ()

29. If the answer is "No" to Question 28 above, why didn't they participate? (Multi-choice)

- a. Lack of funder ()
- b. Religious/ cultural reasons ()
- c. Violence ()

d. Others (specify)

30. How will you rate the level of female youth participation in politics in your community?

- a. High ()
- b. Very high ()
- c. Low ()
- d. Very low ()

31. Do you use social media?

- a. Yes ()
- b. No ()

32. If the answer is "Yes" to Question 45 above, which types of social media do you use? (Multi-choice)

- a. Facebook ()
- b. WhatsApp ()
- c. Instagram ()
- d. Telegram ()
- e. Twitter ()
- f. Others (specify)

33. Why do you use social media? (Multi-choice)

Measuring knowledge on the use of social media	Strongly Agree	Agree	Undecided	Strongly Disagree	Disagree
To communicate with family and friends					
For business purposes					
For social entertainment					
For enlightenment purposes					
Political activities					
Political activities					

34. In what ways is social media used to enhance youth political participation? (multi-choice)

- a. Party campaigns ()
- b. Membership mobilization ()
- c. Party fund raising ()

d. Others (specify).....

35. Which type of media do you think has more influence on youth political participation?

- a. Traditional media ()
- b. Social media ()

36. To what extent has social media affected your political participation?

- a. Highly affected ()
- b. Moderately Effective ()
- c. Less affected ()
- d. Not affected ()

37. How will you rate the effectiveness of social media among youth as a platform for electioneering campaign during the election period?

- a. Very effective ()
- b. Moderately Effective ()
- c. Less effective ()
- d. Not effective ()

38. How would you rate the strength of social media as a factor in youth political participation?

- a. Very high ()
- b. High ()
- c. Low ()
- d. Very low ()

SECTION D: Trust, Institutions and Youth Political Participation

39. How much do you trust political parties as mechanisms for youth political participation?

- a. High ()
- b. Moderate ()
- c. Low ()

40. If low, why is that the case? (multi-choice)

- a. Do not allow everyone to contest ()
- b. Elective posts shared among elites ()
- c. Lack of internal party democracy ()

d. Others (specify).....

41. How much do you place trust in INEC as an electoral institution?

- a. High ()
- b. Moderate ()
- c. Low ()

42. If low, why is that the case? (multi-choice)

- a. Election rigging ()
- b. Cumbersome election procedures ()
- c. Incompetent election management ()
- d. Others (specify)

43. How much do you trust the Federal/State/LGA Government to address your needs?

- a. High ()
- b. Moderate ()
- c. Low ()

44. If low, why is that the case? (Multi-choice)

- a. Corruption ()
- b. Nepotism ()
- c. Not addressing people's problems ()
- d. High level of insecurity ()

45. If political parties, INEC and Governments improve their significantly improve their functional performance, will this increase your level of confidence to politically engage/participate? (Multi-choice)

- a. Yes ()
- b. No ()

SECTION E: Role of Godfathers as Dominant Political Actors

46. Who are the dominant political actors in your community? (Multi-choice)

- a. Educated elites ()
- b. Traditional rulers ()
- c. Religious leaders ()
- d. Politicians ()

47. What are the reasons for their dominance? (Multi-choice)

- a. Educational level ()
- b. Financial influence ()
- c. Political influence ()

48. Why do you consider them to be dominant political actors? (multi-choice)

- a. Political gatekeepers ()
- b. Huge financial support ()
- c. Mass political support ()
- d. Others (specify).....

49. Do you see the roles of dominant political actors as barrier to youth political participation?

- a. Yes ()
- b. No ()

50. If the answer is "Yes" to Question 65, how or why are their roles a barrier to youth political participation? (Multi-choice)

- a. Denying access to others outside their political cycle ()
- b. Undermining others outside their political cycle ()
- c. Controlling elected political office holders ()
- d. Controlling political parties ()
- e. Foment political violence ()
- f. Organize election misconduct ()

Thank you!!!

APPENDIX II: RESEARCH INTERVIEW & FGD GUIDES

Youth Political Participation in Sokoto: Breaking the Stronghold and Creating Pathways

I. Role of political parties and social media in youth political participation

- High voter turnout and voter registration
- Activities of political parties
 - Membership
 - Membership support

- Campaign activities
- Political mobilisation
- Volunteer activities
- Ad hoc duties and employment
- Problems and challenges
- Functions of social media
 - Use of social media
 - Challenges associated with use of social media

II. Trust in institutions and Youth political Participation

- Trust in political parties
- Indices of trust in political parties
- Indices of distrust in political parties
- Trust in electoral institutions (INEC & SIEC) and youth political participation
 - Conduct of elections
 - Conduct of voter registration
 - Registration
 - Collection/distribution
 - Problems associated with activities of INEC & SIEC creating distrust

III. Role of Dominant Political Actors (godfathers) in Youth Political Participation

- Who are dominant political actors? Examples.
- Role of dominant political actors in facilitating/undermining youth political participation
- Pathways for breaking the dominance of political actors to ease youth political participation
 - Suggestions to improve party activities for to enhance youth political participation
 - Suggestion to improve INEC & SIEC activities to encourage youth political participation
 - Suggestion to improve godfather's activities to facilitate youth political participation
 - Other suggestions to strengthen youth political participation beyond symbolism of voter registration and high voter turn out



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